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ABSTRACT            
The land readjustment method of land assembly has an extensive international history, but is 
virtually unknown to professional planners and real estate developers in the United States. Its 
potential benefits are many. It promises to produce efficient development patterns, maximize 
value creation, minimize population displacement, fund the construction of project-related 
infrastructure and public facilities and protect the rights of property owners. Decades of 
experience in Japan and Germany, among other countries, have shown land readjustment to 
be a flexible tool adaptable to many development scenarios and cultural contexts. 
 
As part of a joint effort with planners from the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), 
the regional planning body serving the 101 cities and towns of Metropolitan Boston, this 
investigation seeks to provide insight into the financial economics of land readjustment and to 
provide guidance on how the tool could be employed in Massachusetts.  
 
A case is made for the use of land readjustment in urban redevelopment scenarios in 
Massachusetts. As socio-demographic changes put pressure on our urban cores, the need 
for strategic redevelopment of urbanized areas will be reinforced. The land readjustment 
mechanism can simultaneously address the needs of affected communities and the 
development goals of the municipality in a consensus-based environment. This investigation 
uses the Four Corners area of Dorchester in Boston as a hypothetical case study for land 
readjustment in an urban redevelopment context. A comparative financial analysis is produced 
to contrast the net economic benefits created by a conventional piecemeal land assembly with 
as-of-right development to those created by a comprehensive land readjustment process 
through which community development goals are achieved. The investigation concludes with a 
discussion of the distribution of these economic benefits. The financial analysis tool created by 
the researcher is provided in the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION          
William Doebele (2002) summarized land readjustment as an “effective way of 
implementing the joint development of a group of parcels according to plans which 
better serve the public interest than can be achieved if the process were left to the 
voluntary association of the individual landowners, or to the operation of such 
techniques as compulsory acquisition” (p. 1). 
 
What is Land Readjustment? 1 
A relatively foreign concept to most American planners and developers, ironically, a land 
readjustment-type scheme played a critical role in the construction of our young nation’s 
capital. To accomplish L’Enfant’s grand plan for Washington D.C., George Washington 
persuaded Maryland and Virginia landowners to convey their farmland to him in trust. The 
plan allowed him to retain, free of cost, the land needed for roads, parks and other public uses 
and to purchase additional land for $67 per acre for the construction of government 
buildings. All remaining land was platted as building lots and allocated equally between the 
federal government and the original owners (Schnidman, 1988, p. 6). 
Land readjustment, or land pooling2, as it is called in some places, is a land assembly strategy 
used as an alternative to conventional methods of land assembly such as eminent domain or 
voluntary exchange through the property market. In essence, rather than taking the necessary 
land through a condemnation process or negotiating with individual landowners over the sale 
of each parcel, existing landowners are invited to pool their land together to attain the critical 
mass necessary for a desired development project.  
The basic principle is that landowners act collectively, in cooperation with a municipality 
and/or a private developer, to voluntarily pool their existing real property in order to 
accomplish a clearly defined development or redevelopment project. Land readjustment can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Land readjustment is also sometimes referred to as land consolidation, joint development, or instigated 
property exchange. 
2 There is an important legal distinction between land readjustment and land pooling. In land readjustment, there 
is no transfer of title to the development entity. The original landowners retain title to their land throughout the 
re-platting process and the title is simply modified at the end to show the new property designation. In land 
pooling, the original landowners actually transfer title to the development entity at the beginning of the process 
and receive a new title after re-parceling. For the purposes of this study, the term land readjustment will be used 
exclusively to describe either method, as the legal procedure is beyond the scope of this investigation.  
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be an effective tool in situations where existing parcel boundaries are in direct conflict with 
development goals – essentially creating a barrier to project implementation.  
	  
Figure 1: An example of parcel outlines before and after land readjustment  
(Source: Cities Alliance, 1999-2009) 
 
By employing land readjustment as the assembly strategy, land can be more efficiently and 
equitably re-parceled to suit the project. In addition, a portion will be retained by the 
development entity to provide the necessary infrastructure and public facilities. Upon 
completion of the process, and in return for his or her contribution, each landowner receives a 
new parcel proportionate in size and/or in value to what she put in relative to the whole 
assemblage. The size of the parcel returned is smaller than that contributed, but the value is 
greater, thanks to the development project. In this manner, land readjustment promises more 
desirable and efficient development, increased project values and limited population 
displacement. 
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In What Context is it Useful? 
As a planning tool, land readjustment is most frequently employed by the public sector, but 
private sector actors can also initiate projects. It is particularly well suited for public-private 
development and has been used extensively in a wide range of international contexts, some of 
which this thesis will touch on.  
In its most basic form in Asia, land readjustment has primarily been used at the urban fringe 
for the transformation of agricultural land into buildable, serviced, urban plots (Minerbi, 
Nakamura, Nitz, & Yanai, 1986). There, it is also often used in connection with infrastructure 
improvements - for example the construction of roads or other rights-of-way, such as rail lines. 
In addition, countries like Japan have successfully employed it in highly urbanized contexts for 
both small and large-scale redevelopment projects - to correct the “mis-use” of land, when 
existing uses are deemed obsolete (Doebele, 2002). In Europe, land readjustment often plays 
a fundamental role in the assemblage of fragmented land in order to accomplish a wide-range 
of projects with specific public purposes (Larsson, 1993). Increasingly, developing countries 
are looking to land readjustment as a means to support urban upgrading (Hong, 2012b). 
Across the globe, it is used in post-disaster contexts to facilitate the reconstruction of places 
ravaged by Mother Nature or by mankind (Doebele, 1982, p. 7; Larsson, 1993, p. 33). 
 
How Does it Work? 
 “…land readjustment can be an important tool for developing new land or reorganizing 
urban areas. The landowners collectively leave land for streets and other public 
services, build the required infrastructure wholly or partly adapt existing boundaries to 
the new plan. The new building sites are distributed according to area or value of 
inputs” (Larsson, 1997, p. 141). 
As described above, a land readjustment project is typically initiated when existing parcel 
layout and ownership patterns are prohibitive to desirable development. A municipal planning 
body that possesses the institutional capacity necessary to manage the intense planning and 
negotiation usually guides the process. 
The planning body defines the physical extents of the project and identifies the landowners and 
leaseholders that fall within it. These stakeholders are asked to contribute their landholdings 
to the project on a voluntary basis. In the event that some landowners are unwilling to 
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contribute their land, enabling legislation typically defines criteria under which participation is 
compulsory3 (Larsson, 1993, pp. 87-89). Once the project boundaries are agreed upon, the 
planning body re-plans the entire area, providing for the efficient location of infrastructure (e.g. 
roads, sewers, and utilities), public facilities (e.g. parks, schools and waterways), and private 
parcels. It is an iterative process and requires the participation of the landowners and other 
municipal stakeholders. In essence, the planning body must skillfully re-plat the area to meet 
development goals while simultaneously negotiating with landowners over the size and location 
of parcels to be returned to them. This is a “heavy lift” from a planning perspective and 
requires a significant commitment of municipal resources in countries where land 
readjustment is practiced extensively (Kishii, 2012; Muller-Jokel & Sell, 2012).  
	  
Figure 2: Scheme of Basic Land Readjustment in Japan 
(Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2007) 
 
Furthermore, as much of the economic benefit from the new infrastructure and public 
facilities accrues to the participating landowners, the municipality is entitled to recoup 
expenses related to the provision of these public goods. Consequently, in addition to land 
deducted to actually site infrastructure and public facilities, the municipality also typically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Compulsory participation standards vary widely by country and will be described in more detail in Part III. 
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retains a portion of the readjusted land as a means of cost recovery. By selling off this land, 
the planning body pays for the construction of required infrastructure. In this manner, land 
readjustment offers the compelling possibility of self-financing urbanization.  
At the end of the project, the original landowners receive new property worth at least what 
they contributed and typically, far more. For example, if a particular landowner’s contribution 
was valued at 5% of the total initial land value, they will receive a new plot worth 5% of the 
total final land value. Distribution standards vary from country to country and project to 
project and depend largely on societal views of fairness and socially created value. In some 
cases, most of the added value generated by the project is distributed to the landowners; in 
others, the municipality retains it. 
 
Relevance of Land Readjustment in the Current American Context  
This thesis was born from the idea that land readjustment could be a powerful strategy in the 
United States today. The researcher was initially drawn to the tool by three of its qualities: 1) 
its inherent sense of fairness; 2) its economic use of resources; and 3) its potential to 
facilitate efficient urban redevelopment.  
In planning circles, it is thought that many American cities will face serious redevelopment 
pressure in the coming decades due to a variety of socio-demographic trends. As both 
younger and older generations abandon the suburbs to return to city living, demand for urban 
land will increase, driving up prices (Dougherty & Whelan, 2012; Dawid, 2012). Increasingly, 
urban dwellers are choosing to live alone 4  –a phenomenon that demands transformed 
residential typologies and urban organization (Stern, 2012). Moreover, the recent housing 
crisis has left many of today’s would-be-homebuyers wary and the long-term impact on the 
tenure choices of the next generation is, as of yet, unknown. Additionally, as our society strives 
to become more energy efficient, the density of both residential and commercial real estate 
will be critical in reducing energy consumption. 
These and other factors will reinforce the need for strategic redevelopment of already 
urbanized areas. Indeed, certain municipalities are beginning to address some of these 
challenges through Urban Smart Growth Districts or Sustainable Communities Initiatives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Compared with 10 percent in 1950, the latest statistics show that 27.6 percent of all U.S. households consist 
of people living alone and this is predominantly an urban phenomenon (Klinenberg, 2012). 
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sponsored by the federal government (SRA International Inc. & Vita Nuova, 2011; Smart 
Growth Renewal District, (n.d.)). These programs are valuable for their focus on issues related 
to transit and brownfield redevelopment, but they have yet to incorporate comprehensive land 
readjustment into their priorities. Such large-scale projects touch multiple stakeholders and 
demand a thoughtful approach that is sensitive to both the needs of the affected communities 
and to broader municipal development goals. A process that allows for effective public 
participation in the planning and execution of these vital projects will be needed. Land 
readjustment is just such a tool. It offers efficient land redistribution in a consensus-based 
environment. 
Furthermore, in the current uncertain economic context, municipalities and private developers 
alike are confronted with real-world capital constraints. Municipal budgets are taxed. Private 
developers face more restrictive loan to value (LTV) requirements making debt financing more 
difficult to secure. Land readjustment offers the opportunity to initiate redevelopment projects 
without buying the land. It also promises to (at least partially) pay for itself through the sale of 
cost recovery land. These and other financial advantages of the mechanism could be 
leveraged to unblock stalled yet critical municipal economic development projects. Land 
readjustment may also be a judicious approach for innovative private developers, akin to 
undertaking a project with a ground lease. 
 
Guiding Questions for the Thesis 
The thesis primarily aims to provide insight into the financial economics of land readjustment 
and to provide guidance on how the tool could be employed in Massachusetts. This 
investigation is made in cooperation with planners from The Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council (MAPC), the regional planning body serving the 101 cities and towns of Metropolitan 
Boston. Together, the MAPC and I have three main goals: 
1. To expose local planners, developers, decision makers and community members to the 
mechanics and benefits of land readjustment 
2. To provide a framework through which potential projects could be evaluated for their 
feasibility.  
3. To provoke a statewide dialogue on the conceivable uses of land readjustment in 
Massachusetts.  
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Certain portions of this thesis will be incorporated into a white paper the MAPC is preparing 
to distribute to local municipal officials. We hope that our investigations will prove useful to 
those looking for solutions on how to move forward with much-needed municipal 
redevelopment projects.  
The thesis primarily seeks to investigate the following issues: 
§ What are the economic factors that make land readjustment an attractive alternative 
to traditional land assembly strategies? 
§ What financial economic lessons can we discern from international experience to 
develop an American model of land readjustment that could tackle the coming 
challenges of urban redevelopment? 
§ From a real estate development perspective, how can U.S. stakeholders evaluate the 
potential use of land readjustment in public-private urban redevelopment projects?  
§ To address this last query, the thesis will use the Four Corners area of Boston as a 
hypothetical case study to build an evaluative tool to aid planning professionals when 
assessing potential land readjustment projects. 
Thesis Research Methodologies and Structure 
The research methodology is essentially three-pronged, using literature review, interviews with 
international professionals, and a local case study to examine the technique of land 
readjustment. 
	  
Figure 3: Research Methodologies 
 
The thesis is divided into five sections as outlined below. 
Part I | Introduction This section introduces the concept of land readjustment, discusses the 
circumstances under which it can be useful and briefly outlines how it works.  
Part II | Benefits and Constraints of the Tool This section provides a qualitative analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the tool as seen by the researcher. It focuses primarily on 
	   18 
financial economic issues related to development project costs and benefits. It lays the 
foundation for the financial economic analysis in Part IV. 
	  
Figure 4: Conceptual Framework of the Analysis 
 
Part III | Land Readjustment Internationally This section discusses in greater detail how land 
readjustment is practiced internationally. It explores the mechanics of implementing a land 
readjustment strategy and highlights relevant lessons from Germany and Japan, both 
countries where land readjustment has been used extensively. 
Part IV | U.S. Case Study: Four Corners, Boston This section opens with a hypothesis of what 
an American model of land readjustment might look like. It discusses the context in which land 
readjustment could be employed and how its functionality would differ here compared to other 
countries. It proceeds with a hypothetical case study of a location in Boston fitting this 
proposed model. The case study is developed under two scenarios – a base case 
representing conventional piecemeal parcel assembly and a land readjustment scenario. The 
net economic value of both is calculated using Discounted Cash Flow analysis and compared. 
Proposals are made regarding the distribution of incremental value. 
Part V | Conclusion 
This section includes a discussion of the “true” value of land readjustment. It also describes 
the limitations of the research and makes recommendations for future study. It concludes 
with thoughts on the necessary conditions and complicating factors involved in the successful 
implementation of land readjustment.   
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2 | BENEFITS AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE TOOL    
This section explores qualitatively both the benefits and constraints of land readjustment vis-à-
vis the more conventional land assembly methods of eminent domain or voluntary sale. The 
purpose of this exploration is not to suggest that land readjustment will supplant these widely 
accepted methods, but that it can supplement them. By exposing the technique’s pros and 
cons, municipal actors can identify situations in which land readjustment may be the 
appropriate tool.  
 
Efficient Development/Increased Property Values 
Amassing land through land readjustment essentially allows a development entity to “erase” 
existing property lines and redraw them more judiciously. The process allows for the efficient 
provision of infrastructure, (such as roads, parks and utility easements), and also for the 
efficient re-platting of individual parcels. In this manner, land readjustment “unlocks” intrinsic 
but latent value in land previously encumbered by fragmented ownership and disorderly 
physical configuration. Unlocking this intrinsic value is the primary, but not the only, objective in 
land readjustment projects. In this sense, land readjustment is not that different from other 
means of land assembly – all of which aim to create value through agglomeration. However, 
the “clean slate” approach of land readjustment promises maximum value creation, as does 
eminent domain,5 but without its potential problems.  
In addition to the creation of value, land readjustment also addresses the important issue of 
the distribution of value. This is less prevalent in eminent domain, where the incremental value 
increase is (theoretically) captured by the beneficiary of the taking, or voluntary exchange, 
where the development entity attempts to capture all the gain.6 Land readjustment opens the 
door for a more transparent and inclusive discussion amongst stakeholders as to how to 
distribute that newly created incremental value (Hong, 2012c). 
Furthermore, while not a main objective, land readjustment projects may have beneficial 
spillover effects that reach beyond the extent of project boundaries. By rectifying inefficiencies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Both land readjustment and eminent domain offer the opportunity to incorporate existing public space and 
infrastructure into a redevelopment project. This may prove more difficult for the private developer, who 
assembles land through private negotiation with individual landowners.  
6 Of course, if the existing landowners or their attorneys are shrewd negotiators, they may manage to capture all 
or some of the incremental value increase for themselves. 
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and providing better connectivity to adjacent areas, land readjustment offers the possibility of 
positive externalities for neighboring communities. This translates into greater value creation 
and generates additional monetary and societal benefits across the city. In fact, it has been 
suggested that one of the weaknesses of land readjustment is that it lacks a mechanism to 
recapture this value, creating a free-rider situation. The reverse is also true. As currently 
practiced, the technique lacks any mechanism to compensate abutters for any eventual 
negative externalities that might be created by the project (Hong, 2007b, p. 185). While the 
failure of the land readjustment to deal with either problem may, in fact, be a shortcoming, 
other land assembly strategies suffer the same problems. Therefore, the researcher 
considers this limitation to be symptomatic of a larger societal attitude toward value capture.  
 
The Promise of Self-Financing Urbanization 
In theory, land readjustment offers the possibility to fund the construction of infrastructure 
and public facilities and to pay other project-related costs. This cost-recovery mechanism 
coupled with the absence of purchasing land outright eliminates the problem of a municipality 
making a large up-front investment in infrastructure development and then attempting to 
“claw back” the resulting increase in property values through taxes or other mechanisms. In 
this manner, land readjustment is both a practical method of self-financing urban development 
and a means of simultaneously creating and recapturing social value.  
Zero Acquisition Cost 
One of the principal benefits of land readjustment for a development entity is that there is no 
initial monetary outlay to purchase the land. Certainly, land readjustment is the only assembly 
strategy that can claim this unique advantage. Voluntary property sale clearly requires a 
substantial outlay on the part of the development entity to purchase land at market prices 
before development can begin.7 Although land optioning is frequently used to keep costs down 
during pre-development, the land is customarily purchased at “Time Zero”8 immediately before 
construction begins. The same is true of eminent domain. Government entities exercising their 
right to take property for public purposes must pay the current landowners fair market value 
of the land before proceeding with the development project. Land readjustment, on the other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although many situations that might be advantageous to the purchaser can be imagined, this investigation 
assumes land is traded in an efficient market where arbitrage opportunities are quickly traded away. 
8Time Zero is the moment at which one commits to a development project. 
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hand, shifts this burden to the landowners by inviting them to contribute their land 9  in 
exchange for a participating interest in the value created by the development project. In this 
way, both the landowners and the development entity share in the risk and the return of the 
project (Hong, 2007b, p. 185).  
Cost Recovery 
Probably the most compelling feature of land readjustment – at least from the perspective of 
the development entity – is the cost recovery mechanism through which actual project-related 
expenses are financed as they are incurred. In effect, a portion of the land contributed by 
private landowners is retained by the development entity and sold off as the project 
progresses. This cost recovery land pays for infrastructure and other public facilities and may 
also pay for the administrative costs of implementing the project. Exactly how much of the 
project can be self-financed through cost recovery land depends, of course, on project costs 
and also on project returns. The most significant financial variables to be considered are 
(Needham, 2007):  
§ Land acquisition costs 
§ Costs of servicing and infrastructure 
§ Interest charges 
§ Income from land disposal 
 
The more rapidly property values are rising, the more costs can be covered with less reserve 
land.  Any anticipated or realized shortfalls are typically covered with government subsidies.  
Essentially, cost recovery land can be considered a novel form of development exaction, a 
familiar mitigation technique already widely employed in the United States.10 Exactions are a 
means of internalizing the costs of negative externalities that would otherwise be shifted onto 
others. In this way, the true costs of a project are absorbed within it. Similarly, the cost 
recovery mechanism of land readjustment allows the cost of project-related infrastructure 
and other public facilities to be internalized within the project. Doebele (2002) likens cost 
recovery land to a “withholding tax” for urban development, essentially taxing gain before it is 
received (p. 4).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In making this contribution, it is the landowners who pay an opportunity cost equal to the land’s market value. 
Part IV will elaborate on the mechanics of shifting this cost to the landowners. 
10 Exactions are conditions imposed by the government on a development entity requiring them to mitigate any 
anticipated negative impacts of a particular development. For example, if a new development is predicted to 
increase traffic flow, a developer may be required to commit land for new roads and to actually construct them. 
	   22 
Social Capital Creation 
As practiced in many places, land readjustment has a third major objective – one that is much 
more difficult to quantify. This is the social capital created by private and public actors working 
collectively to achieve a mutually beneficial project. Ostensibly, the inclusion of existing 
landowners in a land readjustment project fundamentally changes the equation. In either an 
eminent domain or voluntary sale scenario, the principal calculation for each individual 
landowner is, “How can I maximize the amount I receive for my land?” Once they are paid, 
these landowners typically have no further stake in the development project. With land 
readjustment, the principal calculation becomes, “How can the project be organized so that 
the collective value is maximized?11” It is an iterative process that keeps stakeholders engaged 
and aligns the interests of the landowners with those of the development entity. This is not to 
suggest that individual landowners are no longer interested in the value of their own property, 
which, of course, they are. But that they become involved in a collective process that requires 
them to think and act beyond their own personal bottom lines. Furthermore, this is not to 
suggest that this process is always harmonious or without conflict, which, of course, it isn’t. 
But if individuals who have a financial, political and/or social stake in a project undertake a 
“mutual gains approach” (i.e. a “win-win” approach) to negotiation, together, they can find a 
way to maximize value (Susskind & Cruikshank, 2006, p. 26). 
Where land readjustment is practiced, of course, laws and regulations that guide project 
implementation usually facilitate this process. The very act of engaging the citizenry as 
participants in urban development or redevelopment expands their role as stakeholders - 
giving them more than simply the financial stake they would have in an eminent domain or 
voluntary sale situation. When this process is repeated often enough that land readjustment 
becomes an accepted method of land assembly within a society, the aspiration is that private 
actors will become more actively engaged in the governance process. 12  The proximity of 
citizens to municipal decision-making can encourage transparency and promote cooperation 
between public and private actors. The resulting societal benefits are impossible to either 
qualify in scope or quantify in value, but they are potentially quite large.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Clearly, the process of transforming this mindset is both lengthy and complex. 
12 In many places, the land readjustment process may actually be a vehicle through which self-governance is 
enhanced, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
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Less Political Capital than Eminent Domain 
Certainly, land readjustment promises to be less costly politically than eminent domain (Hong, 
2007b). The taking of land for public use has never been popular with those whose land is 
condemned and many of those untouched sympathize with those who are. Furthermore, the 
definition of “public use” is an ever-evolving concept in the United States. Both legislation and 
court rulings have broadened its meaning over the last few centuries from public use to public 
purpose. In Massachusetts, it expanded from its colonial origins of taking developed or 
undeveloped land for the provision of necessary roadways to, in the 19th century, allowing 
private interests to condemn the property of others needed for industrial expansion. In the 
20th century, the definition was further expanded to include slum clearance, which resulted in 
disastrous urban renewal projects, like Boston’s infamous West End redevelopment of the 
late 1950s (Malamut, Esq., 2000). 
In today’s post-Kelo v. New London context, private property protections are further eroded. 
Municipalities may now use the ambiguous rational of “promoting economic development” as 
justification for taking land from one private landowner to give to another (Kelo et al. v. City of 
New London et al., 2005). From a landowner’s perspective, this latest incarnation seems 
inherently unfair. He or she purchased a home or made a particular property investment with 
a certain horizon in mind. This is now cut short by the condemnation process. They may have 
established their home or business, paid annual property taxes, and made improvements to 
the property – all in anticipation of either remaining indefinitely or selling when rising prices 
promise a good return on their investment. Just when development pressure surrounds the 
area and values are poised to rise, the municipality expropriates their property. Certainly, the 
municipality must pay “just compensation”13 for the real property, but other losses, such as 
good will for businesses, relocation expenses, and attorney’s fees, are not fully compensated 
(Malamut, Esq., 2000). In addition, the investment property owner is deprived of future cash 
flows, the value of which can only be estimated at the time of the taking. Of course, no 
compensation is offered for the “sentimental” value of the condemned property or the sense 
of loss that an individual may experience by being separated from a familiar community. 
For these and other reasons, property owners frequently resist condemnation, filing lawsuits 
to contest the taking or the valuation of their property. This, in turn, delays the process and 
requires substantial public resources to respond. Neither the amount of time nor the amount 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Just compensation is defined as the fair market value of the property - the price it would attain if sold in the free 
and open market, where both buyer and seller are fully informed and neither is under duress.  
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of these resources can be known in advance. If a challenge goes all the way to the Supreme 
Court, what are the costs? Moreover, it is impossible to quantify the political capital expended 
for a taking, but one thing is certain: at the beginning of the process, the costs, both real and 
political, are completely unknowable, and therefore, imminently risky.  
While land readjustment doesn’t eliminate the possibility of landowner resistance, it does 
reframe the process entirely by giving landowners financial participation in the value created 
by the project. From the landowners’ perspective, this opportunity to share in the “upside” 
potential is one of the primary advantages to the land readjustment method. It is the only 
method of the three that treats current landowners like investors in the future project. 
Compared to eminent domain, it offers stronger protection of individual property rights, by 
preserving (at the very least) their right to benefit from the land, even if the reconfiguration 
process does interfere with their ability to occupy a specific area. 
 
Eliminates the “Holdout” from Voluntary Sale 
Both municipalities and private developers alike know all too well the challenge of negotiating 
with unrealistic landowners when trying to assemble land for a particular development project. 
To avoid generating overly ambitious price expectations, private developers often try 
assembling parcels quietly through shell entities or partnerships. Despite this strategy, they’re 
often faced with one or more “holdouts” demanding a price far exceeding the land’s market 
value. Such behavior can block a development project from happening or, if it does proceed at 
a reduced scale, from generating the maximum possible economic and social value. 
Again, land readjustment is not a panacea for conflicts over property values, but it does offer 
returns directly proportional to both the value of a landowner’s contribution and to the overall 
value of the finished project. Rather than being compensated to walk away on the front end of 
a deal with an uncertain future value, landowners are compensated on the back end, once 
value has been created. In this way, land readjustment removes much of the uncertainty 
surrounding property valuation and offers a more open and transparent process during which 
actors see land values clearly.14 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Of course, landowners may still dispute both the “going in” and “exit” values assigned to their property. 
However, by evaluating the assemblage as a whole, the process reduces the margin of error of valuation on 
individual properties. 
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Right of Return/Owner Non-Displacement 
In addition to the upside participation, land readjustment is also the only method of land 
assembly that guarantees landowners the right to return to the project area. Both eminent 
domain and voluntary sale normally involve the permanent displacement of previous 
landowners. Land readjustment is unique in that it is a non-displacement development 
strategy. Landowners have the right, but not the obligation, to return. Certainly, depending on 
the type of project, not all landowners may want to return. In the case of the transformation of 
agricultural land into buildable, urban plots, a farmer may prefer to take his profits and pursue 
his livelihood elsewhere.  
However, the non-displacement component makes land readjustment particularly well suited 
for public-private urban redevelopment projects where the goal is to correct the mis-use of 
valuable land and to promote neighborhood economic development, while simultaneously 
preserving the existing community. This scenario typically involves the densification of an 
underdeveloped urban neighborhood – for example remaking a central area of obsolete 
single-family homes into a transit-oriented multi-family development. In this situation, the 
original landowners will likely receive one or more units in the new development (in lieu of a 
plot) as compensation for their contribution. Undeniably, this case involves the dramatic 
transformation of an existing neighborhood. However, if the location of the land is very 
valuable, the transformation may have been inevitable and land readjustment is the only 
method that allows for the preservation of an existing community.  
Tenant Displacement  
It must be mentioned that one of the shortfalls of land readjustment is that it only address the 
displacement of property owners and ground leaseholders, whose property claims are 
maintained throughout the process, albeit in a modified form. The claim of renters, on the 
other hand, to the space they occupy is effectively ignored. The extent to which tenants are 
compensated to vacate their space (through early lease termination payments, relocation 
expenses, etc.) depends primarily on the renter protection laws of the state or country, not on 
the land readjustment process to facilitate mutually agreed upon settlements. Each absentee 
owner is left to negotiate with his or her own tenant. As a result, land readjustment as 
practiced in most places probably fails to preserve communities where a large percentage of 
the occupants are renters. Nevertheless, the tool is quite flexible and could be extended to 
include tenants’ interests. A more inclusionary process would not only strengthen the tool, but 
also provide a vehicle through which larger community development goals might be attained. 
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Waiver of Transfer Taxes/Increased Tax Base 
On the tax front, land readjustment can offer benefits to both landowners and municipalities. 
As land readjustment is effectively a government sanctioned land exchange and the 
government usually retains a portion as cost recovery land, the standard title transfer fees 
and taxes are typically waived. This means that landowners are able to exchange lower value 
land for higher value land without paying the administrative costs that would normally apply to 
such a transaction. As land values have now increased, the municipality gains the additional 
long-term revenue that is generated from an increased tax base. 
 
Transaction/Negotiation Costs 
Despite the numerous advantages of land readjustment, there is no denying the substantial 
transaction costs involved in the process – specifically the costs related to negotiation. 
Certainly, negotiation costs are part of any land assembly strategy, but land readjustment has 
a collective approach that presents unique challenges. The first challenge, of course, is getting 
landowners to agree to the project. In places with no precedent to look to, getting buy-in for a 
land readjustment endeavor may be a herculean task. The mechanics of the process and its 
benefits need to be explained to a group of property owners with an unknown level of 
sophistication. This requires a sensitive approach so as not to alienate would-be participants. 
Even after agreement to pursue the project is attained, resistance may be encountered on 
multiple fronts. Disagreement may arise over the going-in valuation of properties or the 
location or value of returned property. All of these potential obstacles demand skillful 
negotiation to overcome.  
The burden of managing the collective negotiation typically falls to the planning body or the 
redevelopment authority within the municipality. Not only does this entity employ individuals 
with the necessary skills, but the city also generally has a vested interest in seeing a land 
readjustment project unfold. In this sense, the project serves a much larger community than 
simply the affected landowners and it is logical for the municipality to take the lead in guiding 
the process. However, the efforts of municipal officials give rise to multiple benefits. Both 
public and private monetary values are unlocked and social capital is produced. Therefore, the 
municipality typically does not pay all the associated costs. Some of the costs are charged 
back to the project in the form of cost recovery land. 
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Trust & Enabling Legislation (Carrots & Sticks) 
Obtaining landowner buy-in is vital to facilitating the process of land readjustment and 
controlling transaction costs. One critical factor in minimizing costs, as in any transaction, is 
establishing trust between the parties. Of course, trust is an elusive element and cannot 
simply be produced, acquired or mandated. It must be earned. This is a challenging issue in 
land readjustment as every project involves a new group of owners. Therefore, the process of 
establishing trust begins anew each time. However, trust is not a prerequisite to collective 
agreement (Susskind & Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to 
Resolving Public Disputes, 1987, pp. 188-189). Despite the parties’ unfamiliarity with each 
other, trust can be established between them over time. It is built incrementally, during the 
process, through a series of small transactions that lead to the ultimate outcome. 
Furthermore, consistent and predictable behavior on the part of the development entity 
across projects can establish its reputation as a “fair dealer” and facilitate future projects. 
In this sense, enabling legislation can provide a framework to guide the actors through the 
process, ensure that legally mandated rights be protected, and minimize transactional 
negotiation costs (Hong, 2007b, p. 188). Of course, one of the key provisions of an enabling 
legislation is the minimum percentage of voluntary landowner participation needed for the 
project to occur. The most effective legislation will likely provide both incentives to participate 
in and disincentives to resist land readjustment projects. For example, incentives may include 
tax credits or upzoning. Disincentives may include penalty fees, downzoning or the threat of 
condemnation (Sorenson, 2007). The “carrot and stick” approach not only provides 
participants with a clear delimitation of their regulated rights and responsibilities; it also offers 
negotiators a variety of tools to use throughout the process (Hong, 2007b, p. 188). 
Of course, enabling legislation doesn’t guarantee harmonious transactions. Countries with 
experience in land readjustment recognize that a critical mass of voluntary landowner 
participation is necessary to ensure a smooth process. Therefore, regardless of the legal 
minimum requirement, projects in many places strive to attain 100% landowner agreement 
(Norbu, 2011). Endeavoring to attain this level of agreement is, in and of itself, a trust-building 
exercise that helps ensure the long-term success of land readjustment projects. 	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Summary Comparison Table 
  
Land Readjustment 
 
Eminent Domain 
 
Voluntary Sale 
Efficient 
Development 
 
✓  
 
✓ 
 
More difficult 
Self-Financing 
Urbanization 
 
✓  
 
Possible 
 
    Zero Acquisition 
    Cost for Developer 
(Shifted to 
✓ landowners) 
  
 
    Cost Recovery 
 
✓  
 
Possible 
 
Political Capital & 
Legal Battles 
 
Possible 
 
✓  
 
 
“Holdout” 
Possible,  
but less likely 
 
✓  
 
✓  
Owner Right to 
Return 
 
✓  
  
Tenant 
Displacement 
 
✓  
 
✓  
 
✓  
Payment of Title 
Transfer Taxes 
 
 
 
✓  
 
✓  
 
Increased Tax Base 
 
✓  
 
✓  
 
✓  
Transaction & 
Negotiation Costs 
 
✓  
 
✓  
 
✓  
Requires  
Enabling Legislation 
 
✓  
 
✓  
 
? 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Land Assembly Methods 
 
Summary Benefits for Stakeholders 
Benefits for Landowners 
§ Increase in land value, despite a reduction in size 
§ Continuity of ownership (right to return) 
§ Conversion of irregular or fragmented land parcels into plots of regular size and shape  
§ Infrastructure provided through land contribution, no additional exaction fees charged 
Benefits for Municipal Government 
§ Land needed for infrastructure and other public uses is captured  
§ Public facilities are built with little to no net expense to the municipality 
§ Property values rise, increasing the tax base  
§ Municipal control over land use patterns, zoning and density is reinforced  
Benefits for Society 
§ Efficient development 
§ Positive economic externalities 
§ Social capital creation 
§ Increase of public-private cooperation and trust  
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3 | LAND READJUSTMENT INTERNATIONALLY    
This section will focus on the economic lessons that can be gleaned from international 
experience with land readjustment. To ground the reader unfamiliar with the tool, there will 
first be a brief discussion on the extent of its use and then an outline of the major steps in the 
process. The emphasis will be on the facets of the tool as practiced in Germany and Japan. 
While not the only countries from which we could learn, both have a long history and extensive 
experience with land readjustment. In addition, they have similar political economies to the 
United States and may offer particularly relevant lessons. This section concludes with a 
deeper investigation into a few of the most compelling strategies used in German and 
Japanese land readjustment. 
 
To What Extent is Land Readjustment Practiced? 
Despite its present-day obscurity in the United States, international examples of land 
readjustment’s application abound and they vary widely in geography, scope and form of 
implementation. For example, in The Netherlands, where land is created through reclamation 
and therefore, expensive, the efficient use of every acre counts. There, land readjustment has 
been employed to re-parcel fragmented agricultural land to allow for more effective farming 
and crop production (Needham, 2007). On the other side of the globe, in Hong Kong, it’s been 
applied in a vertical manner for the redevelopment of existing, obsolete, residential towers into 
new towers built to the maximum allowable zoning envelope (Li & Li, 2007). In an entirely 
different context, land readjustment is currently being implemented in Chile, as part of the 
reconstruction efforts following the 2010 earthquake (Hong & Brain, 2012). 
These examples give some sense of the breadth of land readjustment’s usefulness, but it is 
also worth noting the depth to which it’s been employed in certain places. It has been used 
extensively for over a century in Germany, where the first enabling legislation, the “Lex 
Adickes,” was passed in 1902 (Muller-Jokel, Land Readjustment - A Win-Win Strategy for 
Sustainable Urban Development, 2004). Initially, the tool was primarily used at the urban 
fringe, to consolidate and reorganize unimproved land into building plots, but in the 1950’s the 
law was broadened to include developed land (Seele, 1982). In Japan, land readjustment 
played a pivotal role in that country’s urbanization throughout the 20th century and into this 
one. The latest figures complied at the end of fiscal year 2009 show that, throughout the 
history of its use, over 10,000 land readjustment districts affecting approximately 300,000 
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hectares (1,158 square miles) of land have been created (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism {MLIT}). In a country of only 146,000 square miles, this represents 
about 10% of the total area or about 30% of the urban area (Davy, 2007; Wikipedia, 2012). 
This is not insignificant. 
In addition, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey have all used land readjustment quite extensively. 
It has also been employed on a more limited basis in France, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Israel, 
Australia, India, Malaysia, Bhutan and other places (Doebele, 1982; Larsson, 1993; Hong & 
Needham, 2007). Currently, the World Bank and U.N. Habitat are searching for pilot projects 
in developing nations, where they intend to use it for slum upgrading. An U.N. Habitat project, 
funded by the U.S. State Department, is attempting to use land readjustment in Iraq as a tool 
for the reconstruction of informal settlements in Baghdad (Hong, 2012b). 
Clearly, the conceivable uses of land readjustment are both specific and varied. The purpose of 
this investigation, however, is not to catalogue all of its potential applications, but rather to 
draw upon specific and relevant international experience in order to imagine how and when 
land readjustment can be a useful assembly strategy in the United States.  
 
The Mechanics of Land Readjustment with Cost Recovery 
1 | Project Initiation 
A land readjustment project may be initiated either by a public agency or by a private 
association of landowners. The first step is the designation of the specific area for the land 
readjustment project. As mentioned previously, enabling legislation typically specifies the 
required fraction of affected landowners that must agree to the project. This minimum 
requirement can pertain to either the percentage of landowners, the percentage of land 
owned, or both. 15   For example, in Japan, a two-thirds “supermajority” of landowners 
representing two-thirds of the total land area is required for a privately initiated land 
readjustment project to move forward (Hayashi, 1982). On the other hand, publically initiated 
projects may proceed without landowner consent at all, provided important planning goals are 
at stake. Despite this level of free reign, this is basically never done. As a rule of thumb, 
municipal governments are reluctant to implement land readjustment projects unless 80% of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In countries where ground leases are prevalent, leaseholders are typically also included in this calculation 
(Kishii, 2012). 
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the affected landowners support it. Experience has shown that without this critical mass, land 
readjustment is too contentious and difficult to be feasible (Sorenson, 2007).  
In Germany, where land readjustment is customarily performed as part of a formal Urban 
Development Plan adopted by a local legislative body, landowner participation is effectively 
mandatory (Davy, 2007; Muller-Jokel, 2004). The process “is inaugurated by municipal order 
and without any stipulation of consent from landowners” (Larsson, 1993, p. 36). In essence, 
extensive planning has already occurred to arrive at the approved development plan, including 
a two-step public participation process during which affected landowners may raise their 
concerns (Muller-Jokel, 2004, p. 5). By the time the actual land readjustment is undertaken, it 
is (in theory) merely a means to achieve an already agreed upon end.  
	  
Figure 5: The Process of Land Readjustment 
 
2 | Plan Preparation 
Once the project boundaries are determined and all of the affected real property (both land 
and structures) is precisely surveyed, a plan showing new and relocated infrastructure, public 
spaces, and the readjusted plots is prepared. Whether or not the initial motivation comes 
from the public sector, the responsibility for re-platting typically falls to a municipal (sometimes 
national) agency or redevelopment authority that possesses expertise in city planning and land 
use. In some instances, consultants can play this role, but regardless, the plan must meet with 
government and public approval (Hayashi, 1982; Seele, 1982). The re-platting process can be 
lengthy and contentious and requires skillful negotiation on the part of the implementing 
agency both to persuade landowners to participate and to address their claims to the 
greatest extent possible (Muller-Jokel, 2001). Complicating factors in the process can be: the 
size of the site, the number of owners involved, and the complexity of the future redevelopment 
project.  
3 | Calculation of Public Purpose Land 
Intimately intertwined with the preparation of the new land-use plan as well as steps 4 and 5 
below, is the designation of areas for public facilities. This allocation is systematically 
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necessary to provide streets and to lay sewer and utility lines with associated easements. 
Less systematic perhaps, is the need for additional land to provide other public goods such as 
parks, community gardens, greenways, waterways, schools, government buildings or cultural 
centers. Enabling legislation can provide for the possibility of dedicating land for such purposes 
(Hayashi, 1982), but the specifics of each project will determine what it can or cannot 
support. These supplementary public amenities normally add value to a neighborhood. Their 
existence may increase property values enough to, at least partially, offset the cost of 
dedicating land for them. A reasonable balance must be struck between the delivery of public 
facilities and the interests of the original landowners (Larsson, 1993, p. 35).  
Clearly, each project has unique needs for public facilities. In Japan, there is no definitive rule, 
but typically around 20% of the total land area will be reserved for public uses (Kishii, 2012; 
Hayashi, 1982). In Germany, the calculation is more complicated and regulated by law. It 
depends if the land redistribution is accomplished through the relative size or relative value 
standard.16 When land is returned relative to the size of the original plot, rules stipulate the 
maximum amount of land the government can retain as a “contribution” to the overall project. 
For undeveloped land, this maximum is 30%; for developed land, it is 10%. The relative value 
standard uses a shared value mechanism to divide the land value increase between 
landowner and municipality. In this case, the amount retained can be larger or smaller, 
depending on the increase in value (Muller-Jokel & Sell, 2012; Davy, 2007).17 
4 | Estimation of Total Market Value 
Next the input (going-in) and output (exit) values of the readjusted land must be estimated. 
Both Germany and Japan rely on market values for this calculation, but their approaches vary. 
In Germany, land valuation is conducted by the same municipally appointed independent board 
of experts that makes all important project decisions. This board usually consists of: an 
attorney, a land appraiser, a surveyor and two local parliament members (Muller-Jokel, 2004, 
p. 5). In Japan, where projects are run by a board comprised of representatives from both the 
sponsoring agency and the landowners, outside expertise is sought for land valuation. This 
comes from professional appraisers who hold government credentials (Kishii, 2012).  
The more efficient plat layout attained through land readjustment will add value to the project 
area, but other factors may also contribute to an increase in land prices. Exogenous factors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Germany’s two standard of distribution will be discussed in more detail in the pages that follow. 
17 A detailed discussion and numerical example of this mechanism will be presented in the next section. 
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such as a growing regional economy or the development of new industries may add significant 
value beyond the mere efficiency of land use. These factors should be considered in relation to 
the location of potential land readjustment projects in order to optimize value creation. 
Furthermore, local governments can use the regulatory tools available to them to actually 
control the generation of additional value. For example, land readjustment projects may be 
coupled with existing transit or transportation infrastructure projects that provide new 
connections to local or regional economic sectors, thus dramatically increasing land values. In 
addition, one of the most significant opportunities for value creation during land readjustment 
is increased allowable density or diversity of land uses through zoning modifications or the 
entitlement process. Especially in urban redevelopment scenarios, where both land and 
construction costs are high, these tools should be strategically employed, to make projects 
financially feasible.  
5 | Estimation of Total Project Cost 
All costs related to the project will be estimated in order to determine both the financial 
feasibility of the project, and the amount of cost recovery land available to the development 
entity. These costs include, but may not be limited to: construction of infrastructure and public 
facilities, administrative costs, professional fees, and financing costs such as interest or loan 
origination fees. Depending on the total market value of the land once the readjustment is 
complete, retained land may cover all or only part of these costs. In Japan, when this land 
covers all costs it is called cost equivalent land. When only partial cost recovery is possible, 
this land is designated reserve land (Hayashi, 1982). 
In practice, cost recovery land is usually sold off as the project progresses in order to recover 
costs as they occur. Again, there is no conclusive rule, but current Japanese experience 
suggests that cost recovery land typically amounts to 12-15% of the total project area (Kishii, 
2012). In Germany, when the maximum contribution is fixed at 10% or 30%, setting aside 
additional land for cost recovery purposes is not allowed. However, the municipality can use 
any surplus land from that contribution not needed for infrastructure as a means of cost 
recovery. When the shared value mechanism is applied, the amount of cost recovery land 
varies depending on project value increases.  
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Subsidies 
If project costs cannot entirely be covered through the sale of cost equivalent land, some form 
of public subsidy is necessary.18  This is especially true in urban redevelopment scenarios, 
where percentage value increases are typically much smaller than those resulting from the 
conversion of agricultural land to building land. In Germany, for example, urban redevelopment 
land readjustment projects are not normally self-financing (Muller-Jokel & Sell, 2012). 
Subsidies are quite typical (and justified) when land readjustment projects include plans for 
major infrastructure or public facilities that benefit the broader community. This subsidy may 
come in the form of local, state or federal grants, bond issuances, tax increment financings or 
other methods. In Japan, for example, federal subsidies are available for half the cost of 
construction or rehabilitation of trunk and arterial roads performed in coordination with land 
readjustment projects (Kishii, 2012). These subsidies are financed through tax revenue 
collected on fuel and the purchase and possession of motor vehicles (MLIT).  
6 | Distribution of New Property 
Land not allocated for public use or cost recovery is re-platted and redistributed to the original 
landowners. The necessary title modifications are also made. This harmonious completion of 
this final step is the result of intense negotiation and careful planning during the plan 
preparation phase. 
As nearly as possible, the redistributed land is comparable to the contributed land. Attention is 
paid to the location, accessibility, environmental characteristics and value of both the 
contributed and redistributed land. For example, returned plots are typically as close as 
possible to the original plots to preserve location advantages. An attempt is made to replicate 
other environmental characteristics (e.g. soil conditions) of the contributed land. Lastly, of 
course, the redistributed plots are valued proportionately to what each landowner contributed 
and the value of the completed project.  
As an example, consider a hypothetical land readjustment project where 50% of the 
contributed land is returned to the original landowners and 50% is retained for public 
purposes or sold as cost recovery land. If the land readjustment process results in a tripling of 
land prices, the landowners will receive a plot worth 150% (3 x 50%) of what they contributed. 
If values increase 400%, they will get back twice the value of their contribution (4 x 50%).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In privately run projects, the project sponsor, i.e. the association of landowners, pays any financial shortfall 
(Sorenson, 2007). 
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Figure 6: Schema of Land Allocation  
Before and After Land Readjustment 
 
There is generally some flexibility in the redistribution mechanism in order to account for 
project-specific issues. For example, some landowners may wish to relocate or be bought out 
entirely. Perhaps the original contribution of certain landowners was too small to redistribute 
a buildable plot to them. To address these and other special cases, German procedure 
permits alternative settlement through money, property outside the readjustment area, or 
joint ownership of a plot (Larsson, 1993, p. 37; Muller-Jokel, 2001, p. 3). 
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Other Relevant Lessons from Germany and Japan 
Despite its extensive use in both countries, clearly the process of land readjustment is fairly 
different in each. In Germany, projects are publically initiated, managed by a municipal agency, 
and governed by an independent land readjustment board responsible for all final decisions 
(Muller-Jokel, 2004). In Japan, the majority of projects are privately initiated (albeit often 
through public sector pressure), and guided and approved by the municipality (Hayashi, 1982; 
Sorenson, 2007).  
The different approach means that the attitude toward value creation in land readjustment 
projects varies significantly between the two countries. If we consider the distribution of value 
created from land readjustment as a spectrum, Germany would be at one end and Japan at 
the other. German municipalities tend to “scrape back” as much of the newly created value as 
possible, whereas Japanese municipalities often leave the bulk of the gain to private 
landowners.  
The chart on the next page summarizes the major features of each system and the discussion 
that follows delves deeper into a few useful techniques worthy of consideration 
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Feature Japan Germany 
Initiation of Land 
Readjustment Project Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector 
Minimum Required 
Landowner Consensus 0% 66% 0% 
Project Managed by 
Board with 
representatives 
from sponsoring 
agency and 
landowners 
Council of 
landowners 
Municipally-appointed independent 
board of experts, usually consisting of: 
an attorney, a land appraiser, a surveyor 
and 2 local parliament members 
Land Valuation 
Determined by 
Independent professional appraisers 
with government credentials 
Municipally-appointed independent 
board of experts, usually consisting of: 
an attorney, a land appraiser, a surveyor 
and 2 local parliament members 
Standard of Distribution Evaluation  (Primary) 
Relative Value 
(Primary) 
Relative Size 
(Limited Use) 
Land Retained for Public 
Use about 20% Varies 10% or 30% 
Additional Land Retained 
for Cost Recovery about 12-15% 
Technically not 
permitted, but 
land is retained 
through Shared 
Value Scheme 
Technically not 
permitted, but 
surplus land not 
needed for 
infrastructure can 
pay project costs 
Adjustments Made 
through Monetary 
Compensation? 
Yes Yes 
 
Table 2: Comparative Features of Japanese and German Land Readjustment 
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German Standards of Distribution 
As previously mentioned, Germany has two standards of distribution for readjusted land 
returned to landowners: relative size and relative value (Davy, 2007).  
The relative size standard of distribution is fairly straightforward and is used only “if the land 
values in the redistribution area are homogenous” (Muller-Jokel & Sell, 2012). Under it, up to 
30% of each landowner’s contributed land may be retained by the government. (This is the 
fraction allowable if the land is unimproved. The percentage drops to 10% in the case of 
improved land.) If the government retains any more than the allowable fraction, compensation 
is due the owner. The reverse is also true. For example, given that land readjustment involves 
reapportioning a physical site, it may not always be possible to return exactly the amount of 
land due an owner. The landowner may receive a plot slightly smaller or even slightly larger 
than he is due. In the latter case, the landowner must compensate the municipality for the 
surplus land received. In practice, some landowners will be interested in receiving more or 
less land than they are due. Through negotiation, the municipality will attempt to mediate the 
desires of all landowners. Consider the following simplified example:19 
Landowner A contributes a plot of 1,000 m2 of agricultural land. The municipality is 
allowed to take up to 300 m2 for public use. Landowner A should receive a building plot 
of 700 m2. However, due to site constraints, it’s only possible to redistribute a building 
plot of 800 m2. Landowner A will pay to the municipality monetary compensation for 
the surplus 100 m2 at market values. This compensation will most likely be used to pay 
Landowner B for the 100m2 he was due, but did not receive. 
The standard of relative value is slightly more complicated, but is the most widely used, since 
it’s rare that land values are entirely uniform, especially in an urbanized context (Muller-Jokel 
& Sell, 2012). The main principal is to share the benefit created by the development project 
between the landowner and the municipality. The landowners receive the “planning gain,” i.e. 
the gain in value resulting from the change of use from agricultural to potential development 
land. The municipality absorbs the “land readjustment” gain, i.e. the increase created by 
transforming potential development land into buildable land. Market values are used to 
determine the land values of all individual plots. Consider the following simplified example:
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Both of the following numerical examples are drawn directly from Rainer Muller-Jokel’s presentation at the 
International Federation of Surveyors conference in 2004. 
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Landowner A contributes an agricultural plot of 1,000 m2. The agricultural market value is 5€/m2 x 1,000 m2 = 5,000€. 
The input value of the land for a land readjustment project is 200€/m2 x 1,000 m2 = 200,000€. Landowner A’s potential 
gain is 200,000€ - 5,000€ = 195,000€. After land readjustment, the land is now worth 350€/m2. Landowner A receives 
a buildable plot of 600 m2, which is as close as possible to the value contributed. The plot is worth 350€/m2 x 600 m2 = 
210,000€. Landowner A will pay monetary compensation for the difference: 210,000€ - 200,000€ = 10,000€. The 
municipality receives 400 m2 of Landowner A’s land plus monetary compensation of 10,000€. 
However, Landowner A may negotiate for more or less returned land. The chart below summarizes Landowner A’s possible 
options: 
Landowner A Contributed Land (m2) 
Unit Input 
Land Value 
Total Input 
Land Value 
Land 
Retained (m2) 
Land 
Returned (m2) 
Unit Output 
Land Value 
Total 
Returned 
Land Value 
Compensation 
Payable/(Due) 
Customary 
1,000 $200 
 $200,000  400 600 
$350 
 $210,000   $10,000  
More Land  $200,000  200 800  $280,000   $80,000  
Less Land  $200,000  600 400  $140,000   $(60,000) 
Total Buyout  $200,000  1,000 0  $0     $(200,000) 
 
Table 3: German Redistribution by Relative Value: Options for Landowner 
 
 
 
	  	   40 
Japanese Carrots and Sticks 
“Land readjustment in Japan is considered a procedure to produce serviced plots, not 
a mechanism for economic redistribution” (Hayashi, 1982, p. 118). 
Contrary to Germany, the vast majority of land readjustment projects in Japan (at least in 
quantity, if not in area) are originated by associations of private landowners (Hayashi, 1982). 
Since the 1950s, almost 70% of the over 10,000 projects, representing nearly 140,000 
hectares, have been initiated by landowner associations (MLIT). However unexpected this 
statistic may seem, it is also somewhat misleading because the Japanese government 
possesses certain regulatory incentives to encourage landowners to participate in land 
readjustment. In essence, faced with serious land supply constraints, a legacy of highly 
fragmented landownership patterns, and rapid urbanization, the Japanese invented some 
powerful tools to actually compel landowner participation (Sorenson, 2007). 
Since the 1968 passage of the New City Planning Law, the Japanese have practiced a land 
management system called senbiki – which literally translated means “drawing the line 
between town and country.” This system establishes two principal zones: Urbanization 
Promotion Areas (UPA), where development is encouraged, and Urbanization Control Areas 
(UCA), where it is, in theory, prohibited (Sorenson, 2007). Essentially, senbiki is an urban 
growth boundary and its primary purpose is to prevent sprawl. It also has a secondary effect, 
which is the disparity of land values between the two zones.  
Unfortunately, the initial location of UPA and UCA areas turned out to be poorly matched to 
actual urban growth patterns. As a result, in the 1980’s, this land management system was 
combined with land readjustment to produce more efficient land use patterns. Known as 
flexible senbiki, the integrated technique allows municipal planning authorities to downzone 
“problem” UCA areas to UPA, effectively stripping misanthropic landowners of their 
development rights. At the same time, UCA areas are upzoned to UPA if landowners agree to 
pursue land readjustment projects, thereby vastly increasing the value of their land. While 
potentially contentions, there is no denying that this technique successfully dovetails incentive 
and disincentive. 
In reality, flexible senbiki has had only limited success in promoting land readjustment projects. 
This is because it only requires landowners to form committees to initiate land readjustment 
projects, not to actually complete them. For example, in Saitama in the mid-1980’s, 10,000 
hectares in UPA districts were designated as “problem areas.” Local governments were 
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successful in encouraging the establishment of land readjustment organizing committees in 
75% of the area. Another 1,550 hectares were deemed to have enough existing development 
to escape downzoning. The remaining 950 hectares were downzoned, though this move 
proved quite controversial. By 1995, 10 years after the organizing committees were formed, 
land readjustment projects had been legally started in only 2,800 hectares. This represents 
less than 40% of the original 7,500 hectares where committees were established (Sorenson, 
2007).  
Clearly, despite the creative approach of the flexible senbiki system, it failed to realize its full 
potential because it fell short on both the stick and carrot mechanisms. Landowners were 
neither sufficiently motivated to participate nor sufficiently troubled by refusing participation. 
Plainly, additional tools of persuasion would be useful. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, there 
is a valuable lesson to be learned from Japanese attempts to pair land readjustment with 
comprehensive regional (and national) planning and economic development goals.  
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4 | U.S. CASE STUDY: FOUR CORNERS, BOSTON   
“Land readjustment must be sensitively adjusted to the concepts of property rights, the 
degree of acceptance of governmental control of land development and other cultural 
factors that are unique to each national identity and tradition.” (Doebele, 2002, p. 9) 
 
Toward an American Model 
Although land readjustment has a rich history internationally as an urban development and 
redevelopment strategy, its application in the United States has remained effectively 
theoretical.  Despite the valiant attempts of many to pass enabling legislation and to expose 
the American planning community to its mechanics and benefits, one of the major challenges 
to its adoption is the idea that numerous landowners acting collectively simply won’t work 
here. The individualism buried deep in the American psyche is viewed as a barrier to 
collaborative processes. Collective action is often met with mistrust and the misconception 
that collective benefit must necessarily come at the individual’s expense. If land readjustment 
is to be accepted here, it will need to address this challenge with culturally sensitive 
arguments that plainly articulate how land readjustment can be beneficial to both individual 
landowners and society alike. 
For example, while eminent domain may be unpopular in the U.S, it is an accepted form of 
government intrusion into private property rights. Comparatively, land readjustment is clearly 
less invasive and offers superior protection for the property owner. It gives landowners both 
the right to return and the opportunity to participate in the value created by the project.20 
Neither eminent domain nor voluntary exchange can make such a claim. Positioning land 
readjustment as a reinforcement of private property rights would likely be a compelling 
argument in the American context.  
Furthermore, our society already consents to some degree of governmentally imposed land-
use regulations. Land readjustment could be presented as merely another form of existing 
controls. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld (and Americans largely 
accept) regulatory restrictions on land-use that promote the public’s “health, safety and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Thereby preserving (albeit in a modified form) the owner’s “right of enjoyment” of his or her property, one of the 
essential sticks in the bundle of property rights. Eminent domain abolishes this stick. 
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general welfare.” The exercise of such “police powers” has been judged constitutional as long 
as it fulfills legitimate community interests and doesn’t deny the property owner any 
economically viable use of the land.21 Clearly, the issue is a matter of degree of the control 
exercised. Municipal zoning codes place limitations on the use, form and density of property 
development, thereby preventing individual owners from sometimes attaining the most 
beneficial use of their land. Despite this impairment, these controls are widely accepted as 
generating both societal and individual benefits that outweigh any individual costs. Land 
readjustment, like zoning codes, preserves the property owner’s right to some beneficial use 
of the land. Enabling legislation for land readjustment could be presented in such a light. 
Lastly, Americans respond to the “bottom line.” A credible demonstration of exactly how 
stakeholders stand to gain economically from land readjustment could go a long way toward 
generating support. This investigation attempts to address that challenge; it will use a 
hypothetical case study in the City of Boston to illustrate the mechanics of value creation in 
the land readjustment process. The researcher hopes that the resulting analysis will serve 
two purposes. First, that it can be used by local planners as a tool to evaluate the economics 
of potential land readjustment projects under consideration. Second, that it can be used as an 
informational tool to explain how land readjustment works and demonstrate that it can be a 
win-win proposition in which multiple stakeholders share a net economic gain. While there is 
much to be said about the legal and social implications of implementing a land readjustment 
project in Massachusetts, this study leaves those inquiries to other researchers. This 
investigation will focus on how land readjustment creates economic value. 
 
Land Readjustment as an Urban Redevelopment Mechanism 
In imagining the form land readjustment might take in the United States today, this 
investigation explores it’s usefulness as an urban redevelopment strategy. This type of 
scenario is fundamentally different from one in which land readjustment is used to facilitate 
urbanization. The discussion below outlines some of the differences and describes in broad 
strokes what the characteristics of an American urban redevelopment model of land 
readjustment might be. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 If the land were stripped on all economically viable use, this would be deemed a regulatory taking and the owner 
would be due just compensation, as in the case of a physical taking. 
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Infrastructure and Cost Recovery 
In an urban context, the efficient provision of infrastructure is probably not the principal 
motivation behind a land readjustment project. However, the modernization or relocation of 
infrastructure may still be necessary to facilitate connectivity within the city and increase the 
development value of the land. As such, the need for infrastructure is often less a driving force 
behind redevelopment and more a complementary strategy. In this scenario, the city is already 
a landowner and may participate in the land readjustment process in much the same way as 
private landowners. It may not be necessary for the municipality to retain as much (if any) land 
for the location of public facilities or as a means of cost recovery. In fact, the city may actually 
contribute city-owned land upon which existing infrastructure sits. In return, in keeping with the 
overall plan for the area, the city may receive other land more suitable for public facilities.  
Leveraging Publicly Owned Land 
In cities like Boston, the municipality itself owns significant amounts of land due to tax 
delinquency foreclosures or condemnations. Often interspersed with private parcels, this 
checkerboard ownership pattern is sometimes a barrier to redevelopment and presents an 
ideal case for the use of land readjustment. If the city merely wanted to develop its own 
project, but lacked enough contiguous acreage, a land swap could be arranged. Frequently, 
however, municipal goals are focused on the long-term economic development of an area. 
Rather than develop one-off projects on its own, the city prefers to create a policy environment 
that encourages private investment with public participation, where necessary. In this case, 
land readjustment can be a valuable tool to facilitate public-private partnerships. By leveraging 
public land to encourage landowner participation in a readjustment scheme, the municipality 
can jump-start redevelopment in catalytic locations.  
Return of Property 
At the urban core, it’s improbable that land readjustment would be used to create new lots for 
single-family homes. Therefore, the form of property return is quite different in the case of 
urban redevelopment, where the issue of increased density is central, regardless of the land 
assembly strategy employed. When an obsolete neighborhood of single-family homes is 
redeveloped into a transit oriented mixed-use development, property return won’t be 
reconfigured parcels, but rather in some other form of property of equal or greater value.  
For example, if the land is to be used for multi-family development, landowners could receive 
one or more residential units in exchange for the land they contribute. This type of exchange 
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would preserve the non-displacement feature of the land readjustment mechanism and 
encourage the preservation of existing communities. For other types of commercial real 
estate development, landowners could be given shares in a land-holding association that could 
retain fee-simple ownership of the entire land area and enter into a ground lease with the 
development entity that builds the project. This would give the landowners the flexibility to 
retain or sell their interests and allow them to participate in the value created by the 
redevelopment.  A third option could involve a hybrid solution in which landowners receive both 
fee-simple ownership of a residential unit or a commercial space and a participating interest 
in a land-holding entity. This is certainly not an exhaustive list of the possibilities, which will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the specifics of each project. Many other 
solutions are yet to be imagined. 
The Role of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) 
In an American model of land readjustment, Community Development Corporations could be a 
valuable resource to be explored. Their simultaneous proximity to both neighborhood 
stakeholders and to municipal agencies gives them a unique position that could be leveraged 
in two ways to facilitate the land readjustment process. First, they could be an educational 
vehicle through which information about land readjustment is disseminated to the community - 
familiarizing residents, businesses and local institutions with the process. Demystifying the 
technique long before any land readjustment project is actually proposed could allay 
community fears and eliminate some potential opposition. Second, given their development 
experience and position as local landowners, CDCs could be valuable partners in actual public 
private development projects employing the land readjustment mechanism. In this manner, 
the technique can be understood and used not simply as a land assembly strategy, but rather 
as a means for accomplishing broader community goals. 
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Introduction to the Case Study 
The researcher selected a 2.2-acre area of 
the Four Corners neighborhood in mid-
Dorchester in Boston to serve as a 
hypothetical case study to better understand 
the economic implications of land 
readjustment as a redevelopment strategy.  
The analysis compares two redevelopment 
scenarios. The “base case” represents a 
conventional approach by private developers 
assembling parcels in a piecemeal fashion. The 
second case illustrates the use of land 
readjustment in a comprehensive public-
private redevelopment process.22 
The value of each case is calculated and the comparative results are presented in Appendix A, 
along with the input assumptions common to both scenarios. The complete models for both 
cases are presented in Appendices B and C. This chapter includes a detailed discussion of the 
methodology employed, the assumptions and inputs, and the findings. 
Rationale for Site Selection 
It should be made clear that the selection of Four Corners as the study area is not intended to 
be a recommendation for the use of land readjustment in this location. The goal of this 
investigation is not to advocate, but to explore. Having said that, the site presents several 
favorable factors for the use of land readjustment that led the researcher to select it: 
§ This section of the Washington Street corridor has been designated a Main Streets 
district by the City of Boston. This fact reveals local ambitions for the redevelopment of 
what is currently a dilapidated urban area into a vibrant commercial district. 
§ The expansion of the Fairmount Corridor Commuter Rail Line includes the arrival of a 
new Four Corners Station in 2013 (Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 
2012). This will put the site within a 5-10 minute walk from rail transit and generate 
increased demand to live and work here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Given the uncertainty surrounding potential challenges in an eminent domain scenario, the researcher 
supposes that it cannot produce any better results than a land readjustment strategy. In the best case, it can 
produce the same net economic value. In the worst case, it can produce the same value, but at a higher cost. 
Figure 7: Location of Four Corners 
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§ The vast majority of the existing parcels are either vacant or home to abandoned 
structures, making them effectively vacant. This facilitates redevelopment by lowering 
demolition costs and limiting the relocation of existing residents and businesses.  
	  
Figure 8: Vacant City-owned parcels at 10-22 Bowdoin Street 
(Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority) 
 
§ There is a great deal of municipally owned land interspersed with private parcels. This 
presents the opportunity to leverage public land to encourage private landowners to 
participate, facilitating a larger assemblage.  
§ A public planning process regarding 
disposition of City owned parcels took place 
in 2008-2009,23 revealing the community’s 
vision for the area’s redevelopment. The 
process documented both the City’s and the community’s desire for upzoning. It also 
identified the specific product types and amount of increased density that would be 
permitted (Boston Redevelopment Authority [BRA], 2009). 
§ The planning process advocated for the assembly of public and private parcels (by a 
private developer) in order to realize “a more significant (development) opportunity” 
(BRA, 2009, p. 7). 
§ A portion of Bowdoin Avenue currently bisects the site. This creates awkward 
triangular parcels at the intersection of Washington and Bowdoin Streets, which is the 
most valuable commercial corner. It also allows traffic to flow from a busy intersection 
directly into the residential neighborhood beyond. Both the residential neighborhood 
and the commercial district could benefit from the relocation of this section of road. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  For the purposes of this hypothetical case study, the ownership patterns documented during that public 
process are used as the starting point, even though they may have changed slightly between 2009 and the 
present day. 
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Figure 9: Map of Four Corners Main Streets District  
showing private and City-owned parcels (Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority) 
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Assumptions 
Given that the case study is hypothetical, a series of simplifying assumptions is necessary to 
both facilitate the analysis and to emphasize the most critical issues. These include: 
§ There exists enough market demand for redevelopment of the entire area under either 
scenario. 
§ Both scenarios are developed to their real or hypothetical maximum allowable zoning 
envelope. (See Appendices B and C.) The zoning envelopes used in the financial model 
consider Floor Area Ratio (FAR), maximum building height, minimum lot areas, open 
space and parking requirements, but ignore setbacks.24 
§ The product types identified by the 2009 public planning process – retail, office and 
residential - are the highest and best use of the site under both scenarios. Both 
scenarios allocate the same percentage of these product types to land zoned 
commercial or residential.  
§ The public process identified increased density measures that would be allowed under 
a publically sponsored, comprehensive land readjustment scenario, but not under the 
base case scenario, which is an as-of-right25 development receiving no zoning relief. 
§ In order to consider only project-based value creation, both scenarios are analyzed 
from an unlevered perspective. Neither construction loans nor permanent debt 
financing of the stabilized assets is considered.26 
§ Building demolition costs are also ignored. This study assumes they would be 
necessary in either scenario and therefore, would have no net impact on the 
comparative analysis. 
§ Absorption is rapid and both commercial and residential spaces are fully leased27 within 
one year of construction completion. 
§ In the interests of creating an objective comparison between the two scenarios, the 
quality of rentable space is not considered – only the quantity. There is no 
differentiation in rents between the models. 
§ The financial analysis for both scenarios begins when land is committed to the project. 
As such, pre-development negotiations are concluded and the proposed assemblies 
are resolved, removing some uncertainty from the projects. Consequently, both cases 
are considered to have the same amount of phase-specific risk and require the same 
risk-adjusted returns at each investment stage. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  The analysis attempted to remain as true as possible to City of Boston zoning regulations, but some 
simplification was necessary. Since this study focuses on land value and not on building footprints, setbacks are 
not critical to understanding roughly how much square footage can be built under each scenario. 
25 An as-of-right development complies with all existing applicable zoning regulations and does not require any 
discretionary action by a municipality. 
26 In the absence of subsidized or non-market-rate financing, debt financing should have no bearing on project 
evaluation (Geltner et al., 2006). 
27 Excluding the structural (natural) vacancy always present in the market. 
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In addition, in order to populate the financial model, it’s necessary to make assumptions for 
key inputs.28 These common assumptions are applied consistently across both models (see 
Appendix A and the attached Excel file) and include: 
§ Income-related factors: Rents, 29 vacancy rates, operating expenses and capital 
expenditures for each product type. 
§ Cost-related factors: Hard and soft construction costs. 
§ Capital investment factors: Risk-free rate and the discount rates for each different 
product type and investment phase, reflecting the specific risk of each. 
 
Financial Principles of the Analysis 
Before proceeding with the case study, a brief discussion of the mechanics of the analysis 
employed is warranted. The goal of this part of the investigation is to bring a bit of 
development discipline to the problem of how land readjustment unlocks latent land value. The 
discussion that follows, and indeed the case analysis itself, relies heavily on the financial 
principles outlined in Chapters 28 and 29 of the Geltner, Miller, Clayton, and Eichholtz (2007) 
text. 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis and Net Present Value (NPV) 
Conventional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)30 analysis is coupled with the concept of phased risk 
regimes31 to determine the net economic value of each redevelopment scenario, exclusive of 
land cost (Geltner et al., 2007, p. 785). This net economic value is essentially the residual 
value from each project, that is, the present value of future cash flows to be generated from 
the completed project reduced by the present value of the cost to construct it. This study will 
use development terminology and refer to this as the Net Present Value at Time Zero (NPV0): 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The reader should not be troubled by the specific values of these assumptions. The intent of the investigation is 
not to assert that these are “correct” or universally applicable values, but to use reasonable assumptions around 
which this analytic tool can be built. In effect, these assumptions are placeholders for the appropriate inputs of 
future projects to be evaluated. Any project using this model as a foundation will need inputs specific to its own 
market, product types, risk factors, and capital investment environment. 
29 To simplify the analysis, all leases are considered to be gross leases, where the landlord collects a gross 
amount of rent from the tenant and then pays the necessary operating expenses (Geltner, Miller, Clayton, & 
Eichholtz, 2007, p. 808). 
30 To account for the time value of money, all future cash in- and out-flows are “discounted” back to the present 
using the appropriate discount rates. 
31 There is more risk in the development of an asset than there is in its stabilized operation. Therefore, this 
analysis applies different discount rates to each phase and to each product type to account for the different 
opportunity costs of capital faced by would-be investors at each stage of the project. 
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NPV0 = PV of future cash flows – PV of construction costs 
Assuming a competitive market, developers in the base case would have to pay full market 
price to acquire the properties. In this scenario, where no extraordinary skill or expertise is 
required to develop the land, its market price is equal to the residual value of the project, in 
other words, the NPV0: 
NPV0 Base Case = Land Market Value 
Therefore, the NPV0 of the entire project, including land costs, is zero: 
NPV0 Base Case – Land Market Value = 0 
On the other hand, in the land readjustment scenario, landowners would contribute their land 
to the project at Time 0 rather than sell it off. In doing so, as project participants, they incur an 
opportunity cost equal to the market value of the land they could otherwise sell. This market-
value-based opportunity cost must be treated as a cash outflow of the project at Time 0 as if 
the land were being purchased:32  
NPV0 Land Read = PV of future cash flows – PV of construction costs – Land Market Value 
In this scenario, any additional residual value isn’t attributable to the land (for which the 
market value was already determined in the base case). Any added value owes its existence to 
the mechanics of the land readjustment process and will be referred to as the investment 
value of the land (Geltner et al, 2007, p. 785): 
NPV0 Land Read = Land Investment Value 
Phased Risk Regimes and Discount Rates 
Phased risk regimes are used to separate out the return required for the varying levels of risk 
associated with each major stage of the investment: development, lease-up, stabilization and 
reversion. In addition, each product type has a different degree of risk33  and therefore, a 
different Opportunity Cost of Capital (OCC or discount rate) for the stabilized phase. These 
OCCs are market specific and can’t be prescribed here for all projects, but the discussion that 
follows describes how they are determined. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Despite the fact that the no actual disbursement is made, the landowners are foregoing the opportunity to 
receive this payment in exchange for participating in the land readjustment scheme. 
33 This “fracturing” of risk means each product type requires a unique DCF analysis. 
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Development projects generally become less risky as they approach stabilization. Therefore, 
current market returns for each product type are used as the discount rate of the stabilized 
phase. A risk premium (RP) of 100 to 200 basis points (bps) is added to this figure to arrive 
at the discount rate for the lease-up phase (Geltner et al., 2007, p. 798). As for reversion, a 
10-year holding period is widely used for the investment horizon and will be applied here. Older 
properties usually have more risk than newer properties and therefore, a risk premium of 50 
to 100bps is added to the stabilized market return to arrive at an appropriate reversion 
discount rate (Geltner et al., 2007, pp. 243-245).  
Determining the development phase OCC is more complex since this phase involves multiple 
categories of cash flow, each with its own risk factors. Essentially, the development phase 
includes: land acquisition, construction, and the value of the completed asset at Time T.34 As 
such, the development phase discount rate is really a blended rate “backed out” from these 
various cash flows. It is derived from the analysis, not input into it.  
Phase-specific discount rates: 
§ Development Phase = Derived from the following cash flows: 
o Land Acquisition at Time 0 
o Construction-related cash flows 
o Value of completed asset at Time T 
§ Lease-up = Stabilization + 100 to 200bps 
§ Stabilization = Market return 
§ Reversion = Stabilization + 50 to 100bps 
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) vs. “Canonical” OCC 
In addition to NPV, which is the fundamental measure of a project’s economic merit, this 
investigation calculates two other investment metrics: Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and 
“Canonical” OCC.  
The IRR is the discount rate that makes the NPV of all a project’s cash flows equal to zero. In 
other words, it is a blended rate of return over multiple project phases: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Time T marks the end of the development phase after the project is fully leased. 
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!"# = 0 = !"!1+ !"" !   !!!!      
where: 
CFk = Cash flow for any period k 
 
The IRR is calculated for two overlapping time periods: the development phase, and the total 
investment period, from land acquisition to property disposition. These metrics are widely 
employed within the real estate development industry.  
In contrast, the “Canonical” OCC is not so widely recognized and merits a brief explanation. It is 
essentially another way to measure development phase return. As advanced by Geltner et al., 
the canonical formula measures development phase return by assuming that all cash flows 
during this phase occur at two, and only two, points in time: Time 0 and Time T. In this way it 
offers a standardized method for deriving the OCC across development project investments 
(2007, pp. 789-790): 
! !! = !! − !!!! − !! ! ! − 1 
 where: ! !!  = OCC of the development phase investment !! = Value of the completed asset at Time T !! = Total construction costs compounded to Time T !! = Value of the completed asset discounted to Time 0 !! = Total construction costs discounted to Time 0 ! = Time required for construction 
 
The canonical procedure relies on the ubiquity of construction loans to reason that 
construction cost cash flows are contractual and hence, relatively certain. Therefore, it applies 
the risk-free rate to discount and compound construction-related cash flows. The value of the 
completed asset at Time T is discounted to Time 0 using the lease-up OCC, reflecting the 
additional risk in a speculative asset over a stabilized one. 	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Case Study Analysis 
Existing Parcel Arrangement and Zoning Sub-Districts 
The 2.2-acre site contains 22 parcels and is located at the corner of Washington and 
Bowdoin Streets. Only a block wide, it spans two zoning sub-districts. Local Convenience (LC) is 
classified by the Boston zoning code as a Neighborhood Business Sub-district intended to 
provide “convenience goods and services for the immediate neighborhood and pedestrians” 
(Article 65: Dorchester Neighborhood District, 2002, p. 9). There is no minimum lot area and 
the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is 1.0. The 3-Family Residential Sub-district (3F-5000) permits up 
to three dwelling units per building and is “designed to preserve low-density three-family areas” 
(Article 65: Dorchester Neighborhood District, 2002, p. 6). The minimum lot size is 5,000 
SF35 and the FAR is 0.5. Based on the current 3F-5000 zoning, the vast majority of residential 
lots are too small to permit the construction of the typology for which they are zoned. One can 
infer from this that the City of Boston actually wishes to encourage the agglomeration of lots 
in this area. 
Nine of the 22 parcels are owned by the Department of Neighborhood Development (DND). 
The City owned land accounts for one acre of the site and is shown in dark blue in Figure 11. 
Privately owned parcels account for approximately 1.2 acres and are shown in light blue.  
	  
Figure 10: Vacant City-owned parcels at 334-336 Washington Street 
(Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This sub-district requires a minimum lot size of 5,000 SF for the construction of two units and an additional 
2,500 SF of lot area if three units are to be constructed. 
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Figure 11: Existing conditions showing parcel sizes in SF and zoning boundaries 
 
Base Case Redevelopment Scenario 
(Please see Appendix B and the attached Excel file for the complete quantitative analysis of the 
base case scenario from zoning envelope to residual land value.) 
The base case redevelopment scenario is built on the assumption that there would be limited 
land assembly by private developers with no change in zoning or street location. Of course, the 
combined parcel distribution could take a variety of forms, but the researcher imagines it 
would be as shown in Figure 12. 36  
Lot Assembly 
Several principals have been followed to reach this particular assemblage. First, it is assumed 
that contiguous city owned lots are sold together to the same developer.37 This results in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 It should be noted that the specific lot assembly used is primarily for illustrative purposes. It doesn’t really 
impact the economic analysis of the land’s worth to follow. As setbacks are not considered, the most important 
factor in calculating buildable gross square footage is FAR and this is accounted for in the model. Therefore, 
regardless of the exact assemblage, the resulting land value would be roughly the same. 
37 Indeed, this intention is clear in the Mid-Dorchester Action Plan Draft Development Guidelines. 
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combination of commercial Lots 1-2, Lots 4-6, and Lots 9-10. Residential Lot 22 is sold alone 
and offered modest zoning relief to allow the construction of 2 dwelling units, despite the fact 
that it is slightly under the 5,000 SF minimum lot area.  
Second, it is assumed that most of the private owners of residential parcels attempt to 
combine them to maximize value. 7,500 SF are needed to attain the minimum lot area for the 
construction of three units. This leads to the combination of Lots 11-13 and 20-21. Lot 19 is 
already above the minimum area required and remains as is.  
As for the remaining residential lots, the investigator imagines that the ownership of Lot 16 is 
in question and this legal impasse blocks what could be a larger assemblage of Parcels 14-
16. This results in the sub-optimal combination of Lots 14-15, while Lot 16 is left on its own. 
Both Lots 17 and 18 are small, awkwardly shaped, and lie on both sides of the zoning 
boundary. To facilitate some sort of beneficial development, it is assumed that the City sells 
tiny Parcel 18 to the abutter for the construction of a single-family home.  
Lastly, remaining commercial Lots 3, 7 and 8 are not combined with any other parcels. As 
there is no minimum lot area required in the LC sub-district, assemblage is not necessary for 
development. However, it is hypothesized that the owner of Lot 7 is a “holdout” who overvalued 
his parcel’s corner location and missed the opportunity to sell the developer of Lots 4-6. 
Arguably, the value of space built on his small 1,900 SF commercial lot is less than that built 
on larger parcels, but this is not considered and has no impact on the resulting residual land 
value. 
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Figure 12: Base Case Redevelopment Scenario 
Hypothetical parcel assemblage 
 
Zoning 
Other than the minor zoning relief indicated above, this scenario is developed under the as-of-
right zoning to the maximum allowable gross square footage. This allows for the construction 
of almost 50,000 GSF of commercial space and about 23,000 GSF of residential space 
divided between 15 units. 
Product Types and Net Rentable Square Footage 
Using the Mid-Dorchester Action Plan Draft Development Guidelines as an accurate indicator 
of market demand and community wishes, forty percent of the commercial square footage is 
developed as retail space and sixty percent as office. Using commonly accepted efficiency 
factors, this translates to about 20,000 NSF of rentable retail space and 27,000 NSF of 
rentable office space. All of the allowable residential space is developed as rental units and, 
applying the appropriate efficiency factor, this gives about 20,000 NSF of rentable residential 
space. In addition, parking requirements call for 40 retail spaces, 54 office spaces and 15 
residential spaces. These values are used as inputs in the DCF analysis shown in Appendix B. 
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Net Present Value/Market Land Value 
Using the net square footages derived from the zoning exercise along with the rents, 
expenses, construction costs and discount rates in the common assumptions table from 
Appendix A, a DCF analysis is constructed for each product type. The NPV (residual value) of 
each is considered the value of the land associated with the construction of that product type. 
In this case, the total land market value is:  
Retail:   $0.4 MM 
Office:   $3.9 MM 
Residential:  $2.4 MM 
Land Market Value: $6.7 MM (approximately $3.0 MM/acre) 
 
(These values will be input as the landowner’s opportunity cost for contributing their land in 
the land readjustment scenario.) 
With a total upfront investment of about $22 MM, including over $15 MM in construction 
costs, the development phase IRR for this scenario is 14.3% and the blended IRR for the 
entire project is 10.1%. 
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Land Readjustment Redevelopment Scenario 
(Please see Appendix C and the attached Excel file for the complete quantitative analysis of the 
land readjustment scenario from zoning envelope to residual land value.) 
Assembly 
The land readjustment redevelopment scenario assumes unencumbered land assembly is 
possible as part of a cooperative public-private redevelopment effort that supports upzoning 
and street relocation. As shown in Figure 13, all of the public and private parcels are 
combined to create two large developable areas. In addition, the dogleg of Bowdoin Avenue is 
relocated – an opportunity offered only by land readjustment. This allows a much larger tract 
of commercial land to be sited at the valuable corner of Washington and Bowdoin Streets and 
promotes a safer and quieter street environment in the neighborhood to the North.  
	  
Figure 13: Land Readjustment Redevelopment Scenario 
Hypothetical parcel assemblage, upzoning, and road relocation 
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Zoning 
In order to simplify the comparison between the two scenarios, the zoning boundary remains 
in its current location, preserving the existing distinction between commercial and residential 
zones. As such, roughly the same amount of land is devoted to commercial and residential 
development as in the base case.  
However, since the hypothetical land readjustment is part of a comprehensive public-private 
redevelopment process, it is also assumed that increased density would be allowed through 
zoning modifications. Taking the Mid-Dorchester Action Plan Draft Development Guidelines as 
indicative of what would be acceptable to the city and the neighboring community, 38  the 
researcher has reassigned the zoning. The commercial area is now a “Local Convenience 
Special Sub-district” (LC-SPL). This is essentially an invented sub-district that allows the same 
uses as LC, but with a 1.5 FAR and increased allowable building height.39 The new zoning 
translates into almost 78,000 GSF of commercial space – approximately a 57% increase 
over the base case. 
As for the residential area, it is now designated as Multi-Family Residential (MFR), an existing 
sub-district from Boston’s zoning code. It permits an increased FAR of 1.0 and a smaller 
minimum lot size of 4,000 SF for the first four units. This allows the construction of about 
44,000 GSF of residential space divided between 44 units, which is about a 91% increase 
over the base case gross square footage. 
Product Types and Net Rentable Square Footage 
Using the identical breakdown between retail and office space and the same efficiency factors 
as in the base case, this scenario develops about 31,000 NSF of rentable retail space and 
42,000 NSF of rentable office space. On the residential side, 37,000 NSF of rentable space 
are developed. In addition, there are 62 parking spaces dedicated to retail, 84 to office and 
55 to residential. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Indeed, the Guidelines state “The community’s vision for these sites, as reflected in the Urban Design 
Guidelines…include a wide range of use, urban design, and building design goals that may or may not conform to 
the current zoning code” (BRA, 2009). 
39  Again, the increased allowable building heights are shown primarily for illustrative purposes. They do not 
influence the gross square footage and therefore, have no impact on project value in the model. 
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Net Present Value/Investment Land Value 
Using the same procedure employed in the base case, a new DCF analysis is created for each 
of the three product types. It is shown in Appendix C. In this case, the market value of the land 
derived from the base case is input as a cash outflow at Time Zero, representing the 
opportunity cost of the land. Therefore, any residual NPV in this scenario is only attributable to 
the investment value created through the land readjustment process. In this case, after paying 
for the road relocation, the NPV of each product type shows the land investment value to be: 
Retail:   $0.2 MM 
Office:   $2.1 MM 
Residential:  $2.8 MM 
Investment Value: $5.1 MM 
 
This brings the total project residual value to: 
Retail:   $0.6 MM  
Office:   $6.0 MM 
Residential:  $5.2 MM 
Total Residual Value: $11.8 MM (approximately $5.4 MM/acre) 
 
In the land readjustment case, the total upfront investment is about $32.5 MM, including 
nearly $26 MM in construction costs. The development phase IRR has increased over 
900bps to 23.7% and the blended IRR for the entire project has grown over 200bps to 
12.3%. 
Results Analysis 
This $5.1 MM of investment value is the incremental value that has been “unlocked” through 
the land readjustment process. At first glance, one could simply conclude that it is primarily 
attributable to the increased allowable density under the land readjustment scenario. 
However, this is not the whole story. In fact, it is market demand for space that created the 
value. The upzoning capitalized upon that demand and land readjustment is the vehicle 
through which value was captured by allowing for efficient development.  
It should also be remembered that this investigation did not consider the quality of space 
provided, only the quantity.  Arguably, the land readjustment process, by agglomerating small 
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and irregular lots, leads to better space creation, translating into higher rents and increased 
project values. Hence, the $5.1 MM should be considered the minimum additional value 
attainable through land readjustment.  
As shown in Appendix A, this additional value represents a 77% increase over the total 
residual project value in the base case. If value increases are differentiated between 
commercial and residential land, commercial land increases 55% in value and residential land 
increases 115% (due to the greatly increased allowable residential density). Furthermore, 
private landowners are clearly receiving the majority of this gain. Their property has increased 
95%, compared to a 60% increase for publically owned property (due to the large number of 
privately owned residential parcels). 
Alternatively, value could be redistributed to all owners in an undifferentiated manner so that 
they all receive a 77% value increase, regardless of having made a commercial or residential 
land contribution. The standard of distribution would undoubtedly be a critical issue to be 
negotiated by project stakeholders. 
Value Distribution 
Having determined the incremental value increase from land readjustment, the discussion 
now turns to how that value might be distributed. In what ways might landowners, the 
municipality and the larger community choose to use this value? Of course, the issue of value 
distribution raises the question of stakeholder preferences, which are not necessarily uniform. 
Indeed, this stage of the process may be the most intense part of the negotiation. Preserving 
a mutual gains approach may be challenging when people start to focus on the bottom line, 
but at least land readjustment offers stakeholders the opportunity to participate in an open 
and inclusive decision-making process. 
Whatever decision is arrived at, it will be a negotiated agreement decided collectively. While 
the specifics of that process is beyond the scope of this investigation, the researcher would 
like to offer some ideas for how value might be distributed in the Four Corners case. This 
section is certainly not intended to be an exhaustive list of the possibilities, merely a catalyst 
for discussion. 
Shares in Landholding Entity 
Given that many of the existing parcels (both public and privately owned) are vacant, this case 
may not involve the return of large numbers of landowners to the area. As such, it may be 
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appropriate for them to form a landholding corporation and to enter into a ground lease with 
a development entity to build the project. Each landowner would receive shares proportional to 
his or her contribution and the incremental value increase. For example, as shown in Table 4, 
the owner of Parcel 11 effectively contributed nearly $150,000 worth of land. In an 
undifferentiated distribution, she receives shares worth $263,000, a 77% increase in her 
“investment.” 
The advantage of this strategy is that it allows property owners the flexibility to hold or sell 
shares as they wish. However, it does assume a certain level of financial sophistication on the 
part of the landowners. If they are not well informed about the value of their new property, they 
could be taken advantage of by more savvy investors. In some cases, naïve landowners may be 
tempted by cash offers to sell their shares well below market value. To prevent this from 
happening, it may be wise to offer some basic investing education to project participants. 
Share Values - Undifferentiated Distribution 
Parcel Info Input Values Input % Output Values Change % Change 
Parcel 1 Public $304,633 4.56% $538,028 $233,395 
+ 77% 
Parcel 2 Public $304,290 4.56% $537,423 $233,133 
Parcel 3 Private $466,973 6.99% $824,745 $357,772 
Parcel 4 Public $166,195 2.49% $293,525 $127,330 
Parcel 5 Public $119,078 1.78% $210,309 $91,232 
Parcel 6 Public $156,857 2.35% $277,033 $120,176 
Parcel 7 Private $162,768 2.44% $287,473 $124,705 
Parcel 8 Private $379,763 5.69% $670,720 $290,957 
Parcel 9 Public $569,345 8.53% $1,005,550 $436,205 
Parcel 10 Public $1,623,054 24.31% $2,866,560 $1,243,506 
Subtotal Commercial $4,252,956 63.70% $7,511,367 $3,258,411 
Parcel 11 Private $149,178 2.23% $263,471 $114,293 
Parcel 12 Private $234,724 3.52% $414,557 $179,834 
Parcel 13 Private $201,222 3.01% $355,388 $154,166 
Parcel 14 Private $200,379 3.00% $353,900 $153,521 
Parcel 15 Private $157,606 2.36% $278,356 $120,750 
Parcel 16 Private $116,519 1.75% $205,790 $89,271 
Parcel 17 Private $118,152 1.77% $208,674 $90,522 
Parcel 18 Public $71,955 1.08% $127,084 $55,129 
Parcel 19 Private $467,393 7.00% $825,487 $358,094 
Parcel 20 Private $252,897 3.79% $446,654 $193,757 
Parcel 21 Private $190,950 2.86% $337,247 $146,297 
Parcel 22 Public $262,589 3.93% $463,772 $201,183 
Subtotal Residential $2,423,563 36.30% $4,280,380 $1,856,818 
    $6,676,518 100% $11,791,747 $5,115,229 + 77% 
Total Public $3,577,996 54% $6,319,285 $2,741,289 + 77% 
Total Private $3,098,522 46% $5,472,462 $2,373,940 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Shares in Landholding Entity 
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Creation of Public Amenities 
Another alternative could be to commit some of the incremental value increase to public 
amenities for the whole neighborhood to enjoy. For example, this might take the form of a 
children’s playground located on the residential side of the site as shown in Figure 14.  
Clearly, such a move involves a tradeoff between maximizing monetized value for individuals 
and providing public amenities for the community. The nearly 5,000 SF playground reduces 
the amount of land devoted to residential use. As a result, about 4,000 NSF of rentable 
residential space and four dwelling units are lost. Net construction costs are, of course, 
reduced, as the cost of constructing the playground is less onerous than that of the 
residential units.  
All told, the playground scenario still generates about $4.1 MM in investment value, which is a 
62% increase over the base case. This is less than the $5.1 MM in investment value created 
in the initial land readjustment scenario. Therefore, the playground “costs” the project about 
$1 MM. However, as is the case with public amenities, some (or even all) of this value could be 
returned in the form of increased residential rents. In which case, the net effect could be 
smaller or even positive.  
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Figure 14: Land Readjustment Redevelopment Scenario with Playground 
 
Share Values - Undifferentiated Distribution 
Parcel Info Input Values Input % Output Values Change % Change 
    $6,676,518 100.00% $10,836,411 $4,159,893 + 62% 
Total Public $3,577,996 54% $5,807,313 $2,229,318 + 62% 
Total Private $3,098,522 46% $5,029,098 $1,930,575 
 
Table 5: Residual Value in Playground Scenario 
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5 | CONCLUSION           
 
What is the True Value of Land Readjustment? 
The majority of this investigation has focused on the financial economics of the land 
readjustment strategy. Valuable lessons can be drawn from extensive international experience 
in order to both understand the mechanics of the tool and to imagine what an American 
model might look like. How can we apply land readjustment here to improve development 
opportunities, further community goals and promote societal cooperation? The researcher 
has suggested an urban redevelopment model. However, the intention is not really to offer a 
solution, but rather to open a dialogue. 
Dialogue, in fact, may be the greatest gift land readjustment has to offer. In contrast to 
eminent domain or voluntary property exchange, land readjustment operates in an open and 
inclusive environment. It doesn’t eliminate the possibility for conflict, but opens the door for an 
honest dialogue about both individual and community interests. It is “collective decision-
making” in a “mutual-gains” atmosphere arriving at a “negotiated agreement.” The results, i.e. 
the bottom line, can be measured quantitatively. But what of its process? It is a transparent, 
fair and inclusive process, where “all the cards are on the table.” The resulting social benefits 
are much more difficult to measure, but envelop the aspirations of community building and 
societal participation. At the end of the day, while land readjustment promises a better 
outcome than conventional methods of land assembly, its true value most likely lies in its 
promise of a better process.  
 
Limitations of the Research 
The purpose of this investigation was to demonstrate how land readjustment could create 
economic value, not to guarantee that it would create economic value. As a result, quite 
frankly, the issue of risk has not been adequately considered. From a real estate investment 
perspective, risk cannot really be separated from return. The two are intimately intertwined. In 
reality, no matter what land assembly strategy is employed, if the market falls rather than 
rises, there will be loss rather than gain. However, in an effort to demonstrate the mechanics 
of value creation associated with the land readjustment tool, simplifying assumptions had to 
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be made. Therefore, the case study is founded on the assumption that enough market 
demand exists to build all the space provided under the land readjustment scenario. This is a 
gross oversimplification of the real estate investment decision-making process and lacks a 
rigorous consideration of the risk factors involved in real estate development. 40  The 
researcher thought it was important to acknowledge this shortcoming.  
 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The researcher would like to offer two suggestions for further study. First, to bring more 
development discipline to the issue, future investigations could begin to address the question 
of risk. How is development risk managed and shared between the parties? What are the risk 
factors and how can appropriate risk premia and risk-adjusted returns be assigned within a 
given market? How do such considerations impact debt and equity financing of projects? 
What would investors and lenders need to know to participate in such a process? Considering 
the uncertainty involved in land assembly through voluntary exchange, it could be argued that 
land readjustment might be less risky in the pre-development phase. A transparent process 
where affected landowners agree to (are required to?) contribute their land may remove a lot 
of uncertainty around the question of the “holdout.” 
 
The second topic involves the collective decision-making process. How can it be expanded to 
include stakeholders affected by land readjustment who are not property owners? This 
includes both residents and businesses who hold leases, but not titles. In situations where 
absentee owners hold the majority of the property, the most impacted populations will be the 
tenants. Can they be given a seat at the table? Can enough value be created so there is 
something for everyone, including tenants? Can part of that value be distributed to address 
their interests?41 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The market price of risk is considered, however, in the application of the various discount rates to the different 
product types and phases of development. 
 
41 Perhaps this could come in the form of permanent or temporary relocation expenses, a guarantee to be able 
to return once the project is finished, or phasing the project in such a way that they are re-housed on site.	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Pre-conditions for the Successful Implementation of Land Readjustment? 
The researcher would like to offer the following thoughts regarding necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions for the successful implementation of land readjustment, (particularly in 
an urban redevelopment scenario): 
§ There should be a buoyant (growing) real estate market. 
§ The area should be “ripe” for redevelopment. This means the collective residual value 
of the land should equal or exceed the value of existing capital improvements on it. 
§ Regulatory increases in density allow for more intensive land use, and therefore, 
greater value creation. Land readjustment projects should be coupled with zoning 
modifications or entitlements that allow for increased density in order to create 
enough additional value to make the project economically viable. 
§ Enabling legislation with both voluntary and compulsory components would help 
streamline the process and encourage participation. 
§ Trust between the parties should be nurtured. 
§ The development entity should have adequate negotiating capacity and experience with 
the “mutual gains” approach.  
§ The appropriate balance between value creation and the sharing of benefits should be 
struck in order to incentivize stakeholders. 
Complicating factors may include: 
§ Lack of local precedent means stakeholders are unfamiliar with the tool and need to be 
educated. (It’s socialism! misperception) 
§ Reluctance on the part of the development entity to involve existing landowners. (If it 
ain’t broke, don’t fix it! mentality) 
§ Lack of financial sophistication of the parties can make value distribution and cost 
recovery difficult to negotiate. 
§ Existing landowners are not development professionals and may not be comfortable 
taking on the development risk involved in land readjustment projects.  
§ There are too many owners, making the negotiation process unwieldy. 
§ Input parcel sizes are too small to return anything but cash to landowners. 
§ Institutional momentum hinders adoption of new strategies. 
§ Contractual obligations to tenants and lenders may make participation difficult. 
§ Displacement of residents and businesses remains a critical issue in every project. 
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APPENDIX A | Economic Value Analysis: Comparative Results & Common Assumptions           
(Appendices A, B and C as well as additional material are all included in the attached Excel file.) 
Comparative Property Values - Differentiated Distribution by Zoning 
  
Common Factors Base Case LR Case Results 
Public or Private Parcel Size (SF) % of Total Land Existing Residual Value by Zoning 
Existing Property 
Values by Zoning 
New Residual Value by 
Zoning 
New Property Values 
by Zoning Difference % Difference 
Parcel 1 Public  3,556  7% 
$4,252,956 
$304,633 
$6,578,787 
$471,229 $166,596 
+ 55% 
Parcel 2 Public  3,552  7% $304,290 $470,699 $166,409 
Parcel 3 Private  5,451  11% $466,973 $722,348 $255,375 
Parcel 4 Public  1,940  4% $166,195 $257,082 $90,888 
Parcel 5 Public  1,390  3% $119,078 $184,198 $65,120 
Parcel 6 Public  1,831  4% $156,857 $242,638 $85,781 
Parcel 7 Private  1,900  4% $162,768 $251,782 $89,014 
Parcel 8 Private  4,433  9% $379,763 $587,446 $207,683 
Parcel 9 Public  6,646  13% $569,345 $880,705 $311,360 
Parcel 10 Public  18,946  38% $1,623,054 $2,510,660 $887,606 
Subtotal Commercial  49,645  100% $4,252,956 $4,252,956 $6,578,787 $6,578,787 $2,325,831 
Parcel 11 Private  2,832  6% 
$2,423,563 
$149,178 
$5,212,960 
$320,874 $171,696 
+ 115% 
Parcel 12 Private  4,456  10% $234,724 $504,878 $270,155 
Parcel 13 Private  3,820  8% $201,222 $432,818 $231,596 
Parcel 14 Private  3,804  8% $200,379 $431,005 $230,626 
Parcel 15 Private  2,992  7% $157,606 $339,003 $181,397 
Parcel 16 Private  2,212  5% $116,519 $250,626 $134,107 
Parcel 17 Private  2,243  5% $118,152 $254,139 $135,987 
Parcel 18 Public  1,366  3% $71,955 $154,772 $82,817 
Parcel 19 Private  8,873  19% $467,393 $1,005,338 $537,945 
Parcel 20 Private  4,801  10% $252,897 $543,968 $291,071 
Parcel 21 Private  3,625  8% $190,950 $410,724 $219,774 
Parcel 22 Public  4,985  11% $262,589 $564,816 $302,227 
Subtotal Residential  46,009  100% $2,423,563 $2,423,563 $5,212,960 $5,212,960 $2,789,398 
  
Totals  95,654    $6,676,518 $6,676,518 $11,791,747 $11,791,747 $5,115,229 + 77% 
Total Public  44,212  46% $3,036,175/Acre $3,577,996 $5,362,347/Acre $5,736,799 $2,158,803 + 60% 
Total Private  51,442  54% $3,098,522 $6,054,948 $2,956,426 + 95% 
 
Results Analysis 
As shown in the table above, an additional $5.1 MM in investment value is created through land readjustment. This represents a 77% increase over the total residual project value in the base case. If value increases 
are differentiated between commercial and residential land, commercial land value increases 55% and residential land value increases 115% (due to the greatly increased allowable residential density). Furthermore, 
private landowners are clearly receiving the majority of this gain. Their property has increased 95%, compared to a 60% increase for publically owned property (due to the large number of privately owned residential 
parcels).  
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Comparative Property Values - Undifferentiated Distribution 
  
Common Factors Base Case LR Case Results 
Public or 
Private Parcel Size (SF) % of Total Land 
Existing Residual Value 
by Zoning 
Existing Property 
Values by Zoning 
% of Total 
Residual Value 
Total New Residual 
Value 
New Property Values 
as % of Contributed 
Value 
Difference % Difference 
Parcel 1 Public  3,556  7% 
$4,252,956 
$304,633 4.56% 
  
$538,028 $233,395 
+ 77% 
Parcel 2 Public  3,552  7% $304,290 4.56% $537,423 $233,133 
Parcel 3 Private  5,451  11% $466,973 6.99% $824,745 $357,772 
Parcel 4 Public  1,940  4% $166,195 2.49% $293,525 $127,330 
Parcel 5 Public  1,390  3% $119,078 1.78% $210,309 $91,232 
Parcel 6 Public  1,831  4% $156,857 2.35% $277,033 $120,176 
Parcel 7 Private  1,900  4% $162,768 2.44% $287,473 $124,705 
Parcel 8 Private  4,433  9% $379,763 5.69% $670,720 $290,957 
Parcel 9 Public  6,646  13% $569,345 8.53% $1,005,550 $436,205 
Parcel 10 Public  18,946  38% $1,623,054 24.31% $2,866,560 $1,243,506 
Subtotal Commercial  49,645  100% $4,252,956 $4,252,956 63.70% $7,511,367 $3,258,411 
Parcel 11 Private  2,832  6% 
$2,423,563 
$149,178 2.23% $263,471 $114,293 
Parcel 12 Private  4,456  10% $234,724 3.52% $414,557 $179,834 
Parcel 13 Private  3,820  8% $201,222 3.01% $355,388 $154,166 
Parcel 14 Private  3,804  8% $200,379 3.00% $353,900 $153,521 
Parcel 15 Private  2,992  7% $157,606 2.36% $278,356 $120,750 
Parcel 16 Private  2,212  5% $116,519 1.75% $205,790 $89,271 
Parcel 17 Private  2,243  5% $118,152 1.77% $208,674 $90,522 
Parcel 18 Public  1,366  3% $71,955 1.08% $127,084 $55,129 
Parcel 19 Private  8,873  19% $467,393 7.00% $825,487 $358,094 
Parcel 20 Private  4,801  10% $252,897 3.79% $446,654 $193,757 
Parcel 21 Private  3,625  8% $190,950 2.86% $337,247 $146,297 
Parcel 22 Public  4,985  11% $262,589 3.93% $463,772 $201,183 
Subtotal Residential  46,009  100% $2,423,563 $2,423,563 36.30% $4,280,380 $1,856,818   
  
Totals  95,654    $6,676,518 $6,676,518 100.00% $11,791,747 $11,791,747 $5,115,229 + 77% 
Total Public  44,212  46% $3,036,175/Acre $3,577,996 54% $5,362,347/Acre $6,319,285 $2,741,289 + 77% 
Total Private  51,442  54% $3,098,522 46% $5,472,462 $2,373,940 
 
Alternatively, value could be redistributed to all owners in an undifferentiated manner so that they all receive a 77% value increase, regardless of having made a commercial or residential land contribution.  
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Common Assumptions 
Development Costs Rental Revenue & Costs 
Hard Costs               Retail Office MF Rental   
Core & Shell Construction Costs 
  
  Efficiency Factor 100% 90% 85%   
Retail 
 
 $110  /GSF 
 
  Income 
 
  
 
    
Office 
 
 $110  /GSF 
 
  Annual Gross Rent  $60.00   $55.00   $40.00  /NSF 
MF Rental 
 
 $90  /GSF 
 
  Annual Rent Inflation 3% 3% 3%   
Build-Out (Excluding TI) 
   
  General Vacancy & Loss 8% 5% 4%   
Retail 
 
 $70  /NSF 
 
  Annual Parking Rent  $900   $1,500   $1,500  /space 
Office 
 
 $40  /NSF 
 
  Operating Expenses   
 
    
MF Rental 
 
 $90  /NSF 
 
  Annual Operating Expenses  $19.20   $16.50   $12.00  /NSF 
Surface Parking  $4,250  /space 
 
  Annual Expense Inflation 3% 3% 3%   
Road Demo & Rebuild  $1,000  /LF 
 
  Capital Expenditures   
 
    
Playground Construction  $60  GSF 
 
  Tenant Improvements  $45.00   $45.00   $-    /NSF 
Soft Costs 
    
  Leasing Commission 10% 6% 5%   
Architecture & Engineering 5.0% of hard costs   Capital Reserve  $2.00   $1.00   $1.50  /NSF 
Legal & Other Professional 3.5% of hard costs   Investment Environment   
 
    
Contingency 
 
10.0% of hard & soft costs   Lease-up Phase OCC 12.5% 10.5% 8.5%   
Developer Fee 7.0% of total development costs Stabilized Phase OCC 11.0% 9.0% 7.0%   
Risk Free Rate 3%       Reversion Cap Rate 11.5% 9.5% 7.5%   
 
The common assumptions shown in the table above are applied consistently across both models and include: 
§ Income-related factors: Rents,42vacancy rates, operating expenses and capital expenditures for each product type. 
§ Cost-related factors: Hard and soft construction costs. 
§ Capital investment factors: Risk-free rate and the discount rates for each different product type and investment phase, reflecting the specific risk of each. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 All leases are considered to be gross leases. 
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APPENDIX B | Economic Value Analysis: Base Case                   
 
Base Case Redevelopment Scenario 
  
Zoning 
FAR 
Max. Building 
Height Min. Lot Area 
Add'l. 
Lot 
Area 
per Unit 
(SF) 
Hypothetical 
Tolerance on 
Min. Lot 
Min. Open 
Space per 
Unit (SF)* 
Parking 
Feet Stories SF For up to 
LC 1.0 40 - None - - - 50 2 per 1000 SF 
3F-5000 0.5 35 2.5 5000 2 Units 2500 95% 750 1 per unit 
*Can be provided by balconies or roof decks. For lots exceeding the minimum lot area, open space per unit shall be calculated by 
adding the minimum open space per unit to 25% of the lot area in excess of the required minimum lot area. 
 
Zoning 
Local Convenience (LC) is classified as a Neighborhood Business Sub-district intended to provide “convenience goods and services for the 
immediate neighborhood and pedestrians.” There is no minimum lot area and the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is 1.0. The 3-Family Residential Sub-
district (3F-5000) permits up to three dwelling units per building and is “designed to preserve low-density three-family areas.” The minimum lot 
size is 5000 SF and the FAR is 0.5.  
Lot Assembly 
Several principals have been followed to reach this assemblage. First, it is assumed that contiguous city owned lots are sold together to the 
same developer. This results in the combination of commercial Lots 1-2, Lots 4-6, and Lots 9-10. Residential Lot 22 is sold alone and offered 
modest zoning relief to allow the construction of 2 dwelling units, despite the fact that it is slightly under the 5000 SF minimum lot area.  
Second, it is assumed that most of the private owners of residential parcels attempt to combine them to maximize value. 7500 SF are needed 
to attain the minimum lot area for the construction of three units. This leads to the combination of Lots 11-13 and 20-21. Lot 19 is already 
above the minimum area required and remains as is.  
As for the remaining residential lots, the researcher imagines that the ownership of Lot 16 is in question and this legal impasse blocks what 
could be a larger assemblage of Parcels 14-16. This results in the sub-optimal combination of Lots 14-15, while Lot 16 is left on its own. Both 
Lots 17 and 18 are small, awkwardly shaped, and lie on both sides of the zoning boundary. To facilitate some sort of beneficial development, it 
is assumed that the City sells tiny Parcel 18 to the abutter for the construction of a single-family home.  
Lastly, remaining commercial Lots 3, 7 and 8 are not combined with any other parcels. As there is no minimum lot area required in the LC 
sub-district, assemblage is not necessary for development. However, it is hypothesized that the owner of Lot 7 is a “holdout” who overvalued 
his parcel’s corner location and missed the opportunity to sell the developer of Lots 4-6. Arguably, the value of space built on his small 1900 
SF commercial lot is less than that built on larger parcels, but this is not considered and has no impact on the resulting residual land value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(This page intentionally left blank.) 
 
  
	  	   79 
Base Case Redevelopment Scenario 
  
 Buildable GSF 
Public or 
Private Zoning FAR 
Parcel Size 
(Acres) 
Parcel Size 
(SF) Buildable GSF 
Assembled 
Parcel Size (SF) 
Assembled 
Buildable GSF 
Max. # of 
Residential 
Units 
Meets Min. 
Open Space 
per Unit? 
Notes 
Parcel 1 Public 
LC 1.00 
0.08  3,556   3,556  
          7,108            7,108  
N/A N/A 
Private developer awarded City-issued 
RFP. Parcel 2 Public 0.08  3,552   3,552  
Parcel 3 Private 0.13  5,451   5,451   5,451   5,451  Landowner develops. 
Parcel 4 Public 0.04  1,940   1,940  
          5,161            5,161  
Overvaluing corner location, Landowner 
7 misses opportunity to sell to developer 
of Parcels 4, 5, & 6. 
Parcel 5 Public 0.03  1,390   1,390  
Parcel 6 Public 0.04  1,831   1,831  
Parcel 7* Private 0.04  1,900   1,900   1,900   1,900  
Parcel 8 Private 0.10  4,433   4,433   4,433   4,433  Landowner develops. 
Parcel 9 Public 0.15  6,646   6,646  
       25,592         25,592  
Private developer awarded City-issued 
RFP. Parcel 10 Public 0.43  18,946   18,946  
Subtotal Commercial 1.14  49,645   49,645   49,645   49,645    
Parcel 11 Private 
3F-5000 0.50 
0.07  2,832   1,416  
       11,108            5,554  3 Yes 
Private assemblage meets 3-unit min. 
lot. Parcel 12 Private 0.10  4,456   2,228  
Parcel 13 Private 0.09  3,820   1,910  
Parcel 14 Private 0.09  3,804   1,902  
          6,796            3,398  2 Yes 
Landowner 16 blocks larger assemblage 
of Parcels 14-16; 4 units in lieu of 5 are 
built. 
Parcel 15 Private 0.07  2,992   1,496  
Parcel 16* Private 0.05  2,212   1,106   2,212   1,106  1 Yes 
Parcel 17 Private 0.05  2,243   1,122  
          3,609            1,805  1 Yes 
City sells Parcel 18 to abutter to build 
single family home. Parcel 18 Public 0.03  1,366   683  
Parcel 19 Private 0.20  8,873   4,437   8,873   4,437  3 Yes Parcel meets 3-unit min. lot. 
Parcel 20 Private 0.11  4,801   2,401  
          8,426            4,213  3 Yes 
Private assemblage meets 3-unit 
minimum lot area. Parcel 21 Private 0.08  3,625   1,813  
Parcel 22 Public 0.11  4,985   2,493   4,985   2,493  2 Yes City issues RFP for 2 units. (Zoning relief) 
Subtotal Residential 1.06  46,009   23,005   46,009   23,005  15   
  
Totals 2.20  95,654   72,650   95,654   72,650  15     
Total Public 1.01  44,212   41,037  
  Total Private 1.18  51,442   31,613  
 
Base Case Redevelopment Scenario 
  
Product Types & NSF 
Product 
Type % of GSF GSF 
Efficiency 
Factor NSF 
Average 
Unit Size 
(SF) 
# of 
Parking 
Spaces 
LF of Road 
to Demo & 
Rebuild 
Commercial Retail 40%  19,858  100%  19,858  N/A 
40 
0 Office 60%  29,787  90%  26,808  54 
Residential MF Rental 100%  23,005  85%  19,554  1304 15 
 
Product Types and Net Rentable Square Footage 
Developed under the as-of-right zoning to the maximum allowable gross square footage, this scenario produces almost 50,000 GSF of commercial space and 23,000 GSF of residential space divided between 15 units. 
Using commonly accepted efficiency factors, this translates to about 20,000 NSF of rentable retail space and 27,000 NSF of rentable office space. All of the allowable residential space is developed as rental units and, 
applying the appropriate efficiency factor, this gives about 20,000 NSF of rentable residential space. Parking requirements call for 40 retail spaces, 54 office spaces and 15 residential spaces. 
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Base Case Redevelopment Scenario Summary       Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis with Phased Risk Regimes 
               Retail         Office         MF Residential       
GSF 19858 
   
GSF 29787 Road to Demo & Rebuild 0 LF GSF 23005 Avg. Unit Size 1304 SF 
NSF 19858 TI 
 
$45.00 NSF 26808 TI 
 
$45.00 NSF 19554 TI 
 
$0.00 
Rent $60.00 Leasing Commission 10% Rent $55.00 Leasing Commission 6% Rent $40.00 Leasing Commission 5% 
Inflation 3% Capital Reserve $2.00 Inflation 3% Capital Reserve $1.00 Inflation 3% Capital Reserve $1.50 
Vacancy 8% Parking Spaces 40 Vacancy 5% Parking Spaces 54 Vacancy 4% Parking Spaces 15 
OpEx $19.20 Rent/Space 
 
$900 OpEx $16.50 Rent/Space 
 
$1,500 OpEx $12.00 Rent/Space 
 
$1,500 
Inflation 3% Lease-up Phase OCC 12.5% Inflation 3% Lease-up Phase OCC 10.5% Inflation 3% Lease-up Phase OCC 8.5% 
Core/Shell $110/GSF Stabilized Phase OCC 11.0% Core/Shell $110/GSF Stabilized Phase OCC 9.0% Core/Shell $90/GSF Stabilized Phase OCC 7.0% 
Build-Out $70/NSF Reversion Cap Rate 11.5% Build-Out $40/NSF Reversion Cap Rate 9.5% Build-Out $90/NSF Reversion Cap Rate 7.5% 
               
               
               Common Investment Assumptions 
            Risk Free Rate 3.0% 
            Reversion Year 10 
              
 
  
            Common Development Assumptions 
            Construction Time (years) 2 
            Surface Parking $4,250 
            Road Demo & Rebuild $1,000 
            Architecture & Engineering 5.0% 
            Legal & Other Professional 3.5% 
            Contingency 
 
10.0% 
            Developer Fee 7.0% 
            
               
               
               
Analysis 
Summary 
A B A + B = C         
    
Market Value of Land Time 0 PV of Construction Costs Total Up-Front Investment 
% of Total 
Investment 
Dev't Phase 
IRR 
Project 
Blended IRR 
"Canonical" 
OCC     
    Retail $372,311 $4,603,340 $4,975,651 23% 20.5% 13.0% 134.9% 
    Office $3,880,645 $5,857,814 $9,738,458 44% 13.6% 10.2% 31.8% 
    MF Rental $2,423,563 $4,925,120 $7,348,683 33% 11.2% 8.1% 28.5% 
    
Total  $6,676,518 $15,386,274 $22,062,792 100% 14.3% 10.1% 54.0%     
     
Net Present Value/Market Land Value 
The NPV (residual value) of each use is considered the market value of the land associated with the construction of that product type. In this case, the total land market value is nearly $6.7 MM. With a total upfront 
investment of about $22 MM, including over $15 MM in construction costs, the development phase IRR for this scenario is 14.3% and the blended IRR for the entire project is 10.1%. 
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Retail 
in Development Phase Stabilized Phase 
($1,000s) Acquisition Construction Lease-up         Operations       
Analysis Year     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
    
 
Time 0     Time T             Reversion   
Development                           
Land Acquisition Costs 
 
 $(372) 
          
  
Hard Costs 
  
 $(1,872)  $(1,872) 
        
  
Soft Costs 
  
 $(318) 
         
  
Contingency 
  
 $(219)  $(187) 
        
  
Developer Fee 
  
 $(169)  $(169) 
        
  
Total Development Costs    $(372)  $(2,578)  $(2,228) 
        
  
  
             
  
Operations Cumulative Rent Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Cumulative Expense Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Annual Gross Rent  $60.00   $61.80   $63.65   $65.56   $67.53   $69.56   $71.64   $73.79   $76.01   $78.29   $80.63  
  Annual Operating Expenses  $19.20   $19.78   $20.37   $20.98   $21.61   $22.26   $22.93   $23.61   $24.32   $25.05   $25.80  
  Annual Parking Rent  $900   $927   $955   $983   $1,013   $1,043   $1,075   $1,107   $1,140   $1,174   $1,210  
  Tenant Lease-up & Turnover 
  
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
Potential Gross Income 
            
  
Rental Revenue 
    
 $1,264   $1,302   $1,341   $1,381   $1,423   $1,465   $1,509   $1,555   $1,601  
Absorption & Turnover Vacancy 
   
 $(632)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $(366)  $-     $-     $-    
General Vacancy & Loss 
   
 $-     $(104)  $(107)  $(111)  $(114)  $-     $(121)  $(124)  $(128) 
Parking Revenue          $38   $39   $40   $41   $43   $44   $45   $47   $48  
Effective Gross Income 
    
 $670   $1,237   $1,274   $1,312   $1,352   $1,143   $1,434   $1,477   $1,521  
Operating Expenses & Real Estate Taxes 
  
 $(404)  $(417)  $(429)  $(442)  $(455)  $(469)  $(483)  $(497)  $(512) 
Net Operating Income (NOI)        $265   $820   $845   $870   $896   $674   $951   $979   $1,009  
Tenant Improvements 
    
 $(894)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $(223)  $-     $-      
Leasing Commissions 
    
 $(126)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $(37)  $-     $-      
Capital Reserve          $(42)  $(43)  $(45)  $(46)  $(47)  $(49)  $(50)  $(52)   
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Operations 
 
 $(797)  $777   $800   $824   $849   $365   $901   $928    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Reversion    $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $8,772    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) TOTAL (Stabilized Phase) 
  
 $777   $800   $824   $849   $365   $901   $9,700    
Operational Phase Cash Flows 
   
 $(7,881)  $777   $800   $824   $849   $365   $901   $9,700    
Development Phase Cash Flows  $(372)  $(2,578)  $(2,228)  $7,084  
       
  
Development Phase IRR 20.5% 
           
  
Project Blended IRR 13.0%  $(372)  $(2,578)  $(2,228)  $(797)  $777   $800   $824   $849   $365   $901   $9,700    
Investment Analysis OCC:         
       
  
Dev't. Ph. "Canonical" OCC  134.9%         
       
  
Time T PV Stabilized Asset 11.0%        $7,084  
       
  
Time T PV Construction 3.0%        $(5,030) 
       
  
Time 0 PV Spec. Asset 12.5%  $4,976        
       
  
Time 0 PV Construction 3.0%  $(4,603)       
       
  
Time 0 NPV of Retail Dev't Project  
(Excluding Land Cost)  $        372   =  Market Value of "Retail" Land        
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Office 
in Development Phase Stabilized Phase 
($1,000s) Acquisition Construction Lease-up         Operations       
Analysis Year     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
    
 
Time 0     Time T             Reversion   
Development                           
Land Acquisition Costs 
 
 $(3,881) 
          
  
Road Demo & Reconstruction 
 
 $-    
         
  
Hard Costs 
  
 $(2,288)  $(2,288) 
        
  
Soft Costs 
  
 $(389) 
         
  
Contingency 
  
 $(268)  $(229) 
        
  
Developer Fee 
  
 $(327)  $(327) 
        
  
Total Development Costs    $(3,881)  $(3,272)  $(2,844) 
        
  
  
             
  
Operations Cumulative Rent Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Cumulative Expense Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Annual Gross Rent  $55.00   $56.65   $58.35   $60.10   $61.90   $63.76   $65.67   $67.64   $69.67   $71.76   $73.92  
  Annual Operating Expenses  $16.50   $17.00   $17.50   $18.03   $18.57   $19.13   $19.70   $20.29   $20.90   $21.53   $22.17  
  Annual Parking Rent  $1,500   $1,545   $1,591   $1,639   $1,688   $1,739   $1,791   $1,845   $1,900   $1,957   $2,016  
  Tenant Lease-up & Turnover 
  
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Potential Gross Income 
            
  
Rental Revenue 
    
 $1,564   $1,611   $1,660   $1,709   $1,761   $1,813   $1,868   $1,924   $1,982  
Absorption & Turnover Vacancy 
   
 $(782)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
General Vacancy & Loss 
   
 $-     $(81)  $(83)  $(85)  $(88)  $(91)  $(93)  $(96)  $(99) 
Parking Revenue          $85   $88   $91   $93   $96   $99   $102   $105   $108  
Effective Gross Income 
    
 $867   $1,619   $1,667   $1,717   $1,769   $1,822   $1,876   $1,933   $1,991  
Operating Expenses & Real Estate Taxes 
  
 $(469)  $(483)  $(498)  $(513)  $(528)  $(544)  $(560)  $(577)  $(594) 
Net Operating Income (NOI)        $398   $1,135   $1,169   $1,204   $1,240   $1,278   $1,316   $1,355   $1,396  
Tenant Improvements 
    
 $(1,206)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Leasing Commissions 
    
 $(94)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Capital Reserve          $(28)  $(29)  $(30)  $(31)  $(32)  $(33)  $(34)  $(35)   
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Operations 
 
 $(930)  $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,245   $1,282   $1,320    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Reversion    $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $14,696    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) TOTAL (Stabilized Phase) 
  
 $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,245   $1,282   $16,016    
Operational Phase Cash Flows 
   
 $(14,070)  $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,245   $1,282   $16,016    
Development Phase Cash Flows  $(3,881)  $(3,272)  $(2,844)  $13,139  
       
  
Development Phase IRR 13.6% 
           
  
Project Blended IRR 10.2%  $(3,881)  $(3,272)  $(2,844)  $(930)  $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,245   $1,282   $16,016    
Investment Analysis OCC:         
       
  
Dev't. Ph. "Canonical" OCC  31.8%         
       
  
Time T PV Stabilized Asset 9.0%        $13,139  
       
  
Time T PV Construction 3.0%        $(6,401) 
       
  
Time 0 PV Spec. Asset 10.5%  $9,738        
       
  
Time 0 PV Construction 3.0%  $(5,858)       
       
  
Time 0 NPV of Office Dev't Project  
(Excluding Land Cost)  $     3,881   =  Market Value of "Office" Land        
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MF Rental 
in Development Phase Stabilized Phase 
($1,000s) Acquisition Construction Lease-up         Operations       
Analysis Year     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
    
 
Time 0     Time T             Reversion   
Development                           
Land Acquisition Costs 
 
 $(2,424) 
          
  
Hard Costs 
  
 $(1,947)  $(1,947) 
        
  
Soft Costs 
  
 $(331) 
         
  
Contingency 
  
 $(227.80)  $(195) 
        
  
Developer Fee 
  
 $(247)  $(247) 
        
  
Total Development Costs    $(2,424)  $(2,753)  $(2,389) 
        
  
  
             
  
Operations Cumulative Rent Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Cumulative Expense Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Annual Gross Rent  $40.00   $41.20   $42.44   $43.71   $45.02   $46.37   $47.76   $49.19   $50.67   $52.19   $53.76  
  Annual Operating Expenses  $12.00   $12.36   $12.73   $13.11   $13.51   $13.91   $14.33   $14.76   $15.20   $15.66   $16.13  
  Annual Parking Rent  $1,500   $1,545   $1,591   $1,639   $1,688   $1,739   $1,791   $1,845   $1,900   $1,957   $2,016  
  Tenant Lease-up & Turnover 
  
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Potential Gross Income 
 
Avg. Unit Avg Rent 
         
  
Rental Revenue 
 
1304 SF  $4,345  
 
 $830   $855   $880   $907   $934   $962   $991   $1,021   $1,051  
Absorption & Turnover Vacancy 
   
 $(415)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
General Vacancy & Loss 
   
 $-     $(34)  $(35)  $(36)  $(37)  $(38)  $(40)  $(41)  $(42) 
Parking Revenue          $24   $25   $25   $26   $27   $28   $29   $29   $30  
Effective Gross Income 
    
 $439   $845   $870   $897   $923   $951   $980   $1,009   $1,039  
Operating Expenses & Real Estate Taxes 
  
 $(249)  $(256)  $(264)  $(272)  $(280)  $(289)  $(297)  $(306)  $(315) 
Net Operating Income (NOI)        $190   $589   $606   $625   $643   $663   $682   $703   $724  
Tenant Improvements 
    
 $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Leasing Commissions 
    
 $(41)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Capital Reserve          $(31)  $(32)  $(33)  $(34)  $(35)  $(36)  $(37)  $(38)   
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Operations 
 
 $117   $557   $573   $591   $608   $626   $645   $665    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Reversion    $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $9,653    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) TOTAL (Stabilized Phase) 
  
 $557   $573   $591   $608   $626   $645   $10,318    
Operational Phase Cash Flows 
   
 $(9,269)  $557   $573   $591   $608   $626   $645   $10,318    
Development Phase Cash Flows  $(2,424)  $(2,753)  $(2,389)  $9,386  
       
  
Development Phase IRR 11.2% 
           
  
Project Blended IRR 8.1%  $(2,424)  $(2,753)  $(2,389)  $117   $557   $573   $591   $608   $626   $645   $10,318    
Investment Analysis OCC:         
       
  
Dev't. Ph. "Canonical" OCC  28.5%         
       
  
Time T PV Stabilized Asset 7.0%        $9,386  
       
  
Time T PV Construction 3.0%        $(5,382) 
       
  
Time 0 PV Spec. Asset 8.5%  $7,349        
       
  
Time 0 PV Construction 3.0%  $(4,925)       
       
  
Time 0 NPV of MF Dev't Project  
(Excluding Land Cost)  $     2,424   =  Market Value of "MF Rental" Land        
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APPENDIX C | Economic Value Analysis: Land Readjustment Case                
 
Land Readjustment Redevelopment Scenario 
  
Zoning 
FAR 
Max. Building 
Height Min. Lot Area Add'l. Lot Area  Min. Open 
Space per 
Unit (SF)* 
Parking 
Feet Stories SF For up to SF 
For 
each 
add'l 
LC - Special 1.5 50 4 None - - - 50 2 per 1000 SF 
MFR 1.0 35 3 4000 4 Units 1000 1 Unit 400 1.25 per unit 
*Can be provided by balconies or roof decks. For lots exceeding the minimum lot area, open space per unit shall be calculated 
by adding the minimum open space per unit to 25% of the lot area in excess of the required minimum lot area. 
 
Zoning 
In order to simplify the comparison between the two scenarios, the zoning boundary remains in its current location, preserving the existing 
distinction between commercial and residential zones. As such, roughly the same amount of land is devoted to commercial and residential 
development as in the base case.  
However, since the hypothetical land readjustment is part of a comprehensive public-private redevelopment process, it is also assumed that 
increased density would be allowed through zoning modifications. Taking the Mid-Dorchester Action Plan Draft Development Guidelines as 
indicative of what would be acceptable to the city and the neighboring community, the researcher reassigned the zoning. The commercial area 
is now a “Local Convenience Special Sub-district” (LC-SPL). This is essentially an invented sub-district that allows the same uses as LC, but with 
a 1.5 FAR and increased allowable building height.  
The residential area is now designated as Multi-Family Residential (MFR), an existing sub-district from Boston’s zoning code. It permits an 
increased FAR of 1.0 and a smaller minimum lot size of 4000 SF for the first four units. 
Assembly 
The land readjustment scenario assumes unencumbered land assembly is possible as part of a cooperative public-private redevelopment 
effort that supports upzoning and street relocation. All of the public and private parcels are combined to create two large developable areas. In 
addition, the dogleg of Bowdoin Avenue is relocated – an opportunity offered only through land readjustment. This allows a much larger tract of 
commercial land to be sited at the valuable corner of Washington and Bowdoin Streets and promotes a safer and quieter street environment 
in the neighborhood to the North.  
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Land Readjustment Redevelopment Scenario 
  
Buildable GSF 
Zoning FAR Area Size (Acres) 
Area Size  
(SF) Buildable GSF 
Max. # of 
Residential 
Units 
Meets 
Min. Open 
Space Per 
Unit? 
Notes 
Area A 
LC - Special 1.5 
 0.85   37,120   55,680  N/A N/A   
Area B  0.34   14,757   22,136    
Subtotal Commercial  1.19   51,877   77,816    
Area C 
MFR 1.0 
 0.30   12,904   12,904  16 Yes   
Area D  0.71   31,007   31,007  32 Yes   
Subtotal Residential  1.01   43,911   43,911  44   
  Totals  2.20   95,788   121,727  44     
 
Land Readjustment Redevelopment Scenario 
  
Product Types & NSF 
Product 
Type % of GSF GSF 
Efficiency 
Factor NSF 
Average 
Unit Size 
(SF) 
# of 
Parking 
Spaces 
LF of Road 
to Demo & 
Rebuild 
Commercial Retail 40%  31,126  100%  31,126  N/A 
62 
240 Office 60%  46,689  90%  42,020  84 
Residential MF Rental 100%  43,911  85%  37,324  848 55 
 
Product Types and Net Rentable Square Footage 
The new zoning translates into almost 78,000 GSF of commercial space – approximately a 57% increase over the base case. It also allows for the construction of about 44,000 GSF of residential space divided 
between 44 units, which is about a 91% increase over the base case gross square footage. 
Using the identical breakdown between retail and office space and the same efficiency factors as in the base case, this scenario develops about 31,000 NSF of rentable retail space and 42,000 NSF of rentable office 
space. On the residential side, 37,000 NSF of rentable space are developed. In addition, there are 62 parking spaces dedicated to retail, 84 to office and 55 to residential. 
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Land Readjustment Redevelopment Summary       Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis with Phased Risk Regimes 
               Retail         Office         MF Residential       
GSF 31126 
   
GSF 46689 Road to Demo & Rebuild 240 LF GSF 43911 Avg. Unit Size 848 SF 
NSF 31126 TI 
 
$45.00 NSF 42020 TI 
 
$45.00 NSF 37324 TI 
 
$0.00 
Rent $60.00 Leasing Commission 10% Rent $55.00 Leasing Commission 6% Rent $40.00 Leasing Commission 5% 
Inflation 3% Capital Reserve $2.00 Inflation 3% Capital Reserve $1.00 Inflation 3% Capital Reserve $1.50 
Vacancy 8% Parking Spaces 62 Vacancy 5% Parking Spaces 84 Vacancy 4% Parking Spaces 55 
OpEx $19.20 Rent/Space 
 
$900 OpEx $16.50 Rent/Space 
 
$1,500 OpEx $12.00 Rent/Space 
 
$1,500 
Inflation 3% Lease-up Phase OCC 12.5% Inflation 3% Lease-up Phase OCC 10.5% Inflation 3% Lease-up Phase OCC 8.5% 
Core/Shell $110/GSF Stabilized Phase OCC 11.0% Core/Shell $110/GSF Stabilized Phase OCC 9.0% Core/Shell $90/GSF Stabilized Phase OCC 7.0% 
Build-Out $70/NSF Reversion Cap Rate 11.5% Build-Out $40/NSF Reversion Cap Rate 9.5% Build-Out $90/NSF Reversion Cap Rate 7.5% 
               
               
               Common Investment Assumptions 
            Risk Free Rate 3.0% 
            Reversion Year 10 
              
 
  
            Common Development Assumptions 
            Construction Time (years) 2 
            Surface Parking $4,250 
            Road Demo & Rebuild $1,000 
            Architecture & Engineering 5.0% 
            Legal & Other Professional 3.5% 
            Contingency 
 
10.0% 
            Developer Fee 7.0% 
            
               
               
               
Analysis 
Summary 
A B A + B = C D A + D = E         
Land Opportunity Cost from 
Base Case 
Time 0 PV of Construction 
Costs Total Up-Front Investment 
Investment Value Created by 
LR Total Residual Project Value 
% of Total 
Investment 
Dev't Phase 
IRR 
Project 
Blended IRR 
"Canonical" 
OCC 
Retail $372,311 $7,201,306 $7,573,617 $225,412 $597,723 23% 23.1% 13.5% 132.7% 
Office $3,880,645 $9,283,374 $13,164,019 $2,100,419 $5,981,063 40% 22.9% 12.4% 32.2% 
MF Rental $2,423,563 $9,390,632 $11,814,194 $2,789,398 $5,212,960 36% 25.1% 11.3% 26.9% 
Total  $6,676,518 $25,875,312 $32,551,830 $5,115,229 $11,791,747 100% 23.7% 12.3% 53.6% 
 
Net Present Value/Investment Land Value 
Using the same procedure employed in the base case, a new DCF analysis is created for each of the three product types. In this case, the market value of the land derived from the base case is input as a cash outflow 
at Time Zero, representing the opportunity cost of the land. Therefore, any residual NPV in this scenario is only attributable to the investment value created through the land readjustment process. In this case, after 
paying for the road relocation, the NPV of the project shows the land investment value to be over $5.1 MM, bringing the total residual project value to nearly $11.8 MM. 
The total upfront investment is about $32.5 MM, including nearly $26 MM in construction costs. The development phase IRR has increased over 900bps to 23.7% and the blended IRR for the entire project has grown 
over 200bps to 12.3%. 
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Retail 
in Development Phase Stabilized Phase 
($1,000s) Acquisition Construction Lease-up         Operations       
Analysis Year     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
    
 
Time 0     Time T             Reversion   
Development                           
Land Acquisition Costs 
 
 $(372) 
          
  
Hard Costs 
  
 $(2,934)  $(2,934) 
        
  
Soft Costs 
  
 $(499) 
         
  
Contingency 
  
 $(343)  $(293) 
        
  
Developer Fee 
  
 $(258)  $(258) 
        
  
Total Development Costs    $(372)  $(4,034)  $(3,485) 
        
  
  
             
  
Operations Cumulative Rent Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Cumulative Expense Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Annual Gross Rent  $60.00   $61.80   $63.65   $65.56   $67.53   $69.56   $71.64   $73.79   $76.01   $78.29   $80.63  
  Annual Operating Expenses  $19.20   $19.78   $20.37   $20.98   $21.61   $22.26   $22.93   $23.61   $24.32   $25.05   $25.80  
  Annual Parking Rent  $900   $927   $955   $983   $1,013   $1,043   $1,075   $1,107   $1,140   $1,174   $1,210  
  Tenant Lease-up & Turnover 
  
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
Potential Gross Income 
            
  
Rental Revenue 
    
 $1,981   $2,041   $2,102   $2,165   $2,230   $2,297   $2,366   $2,437   $2,510  
Absorption & Turnover Vacancy 
   
 $(991)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $(574)  $-     $-     $-    
General Vacancy & Loss 
   
 $-     $(163)  $(168)  $(173)  $(178)  $-     $(189)  $(195)  $(201) 
Parking Revenue          $59   $61   $63   $65   $67   $69   $71   $73   $75  
Effective Gross Income 
    
 $1,050   $1,939   $1,997   $2,057   $2,118   $1,792   $2,247   $2,315   $2,384  
Operating Expenses & Real Estate Taxes 
  
 $(634)  $(653)  $(673)  $(693)  $(714)  $(735)  $(757)  $(780)  $(803) 
Net Operating Income (NOI)        $416   $1,286   $1,324   $1,364   $1,405   $1,057   $1,490   $1,535   $1,581  
Tenant Improvements 
    
 $(1,401)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $(350)  $-     $-      
Leasing Commissions 
    
 $(198)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $(57)  $-     $-      
Capital Reserve          $(66)  $(68)  $(70)  $(72)  $(74)  $(77)  $(79)  $(81)   
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Operations 
 
 $(1,249)  $1,218   $1,254   $1,292   $1,331   $572   $1,412   $1,454    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Reversion    $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $13,750    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) TOTAL (Stabilized Phase) 
  
 $1,218   $1,254   $1,292   $1,331   $572   $1,412   $15,204    
Operational Phase Cash Flows 
   
 $(12,353)  $1,218   $1,254   $1,292   $1,331   $572   $1,412   $15,204    
Development Phase Cash Flows  $(372)  $(4,034)  $(3,485)  $11,104  
       
  
Development Phase IRR 23.1% 
           
  
Project Blended IRR 13.5%  $(372)  $(4,034)  $(3,485)  $(1,249)  $1,218   $1,254   $1,292   $1,331   $572   $1,412   $15,204    
Investment Analysis OCC:         
       
  
Dev't. Ph. "Canonical" OCC  132.7%         
       
  
Time T PV Stabilized Asset 11.0%        $11,104  
       
  
Time T PV Construction 3.0%        $(7,869) 
       
  
Time 0 PV Spec. Asset 12.5%  $7,799        
       
  
Time 0 PV Construction 3.0%  $(7,201)       
       
  
Time 0 Land Acquisition Cost  $(372)       
       
  
Time 0 NPV of Retail Dev't Project  
(Including Land Opportunity Cost)  $        225   =  Investment Value Created by LR        
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Office 
in Development Phase Stabilized Phase 
($1,000s) Acquisition Construction Lease-up         Operations       
Analysis Year     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
    
 
Time 0     Time T             Reversion   
Development                           
Land Acquisition Costs 
 
 $(3,881) 
          
  
Road Demo & Reconstruction 
 
 $(240) 
         
  
Hard Costs 
  
 $(3,587)  $(3,587) 
        
  
Soft Costs 
  
 $(610) 
         
  
Contingency 
  
 $(420)  $(359) 
        
  
Developer Fee 
  
 $(444)  $(444) 
        
  
Total Development Costs    $(3,881)  $(5,300)  $(4,389) 
        
  
  
             
  
Operations Cumulative Rent Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Cumulative Expense Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Annual Gross Rent  $55.00   $56.65   $58.35   $60.10   $61.90   $63.76   $65.67   $67.64   $69.67   $71.76   $73.92  
  Annual Operating Expenses  $16.50   $17.00   $17.50   $18.03   $18.57   $19.13   $19.70   $20.29   $20.90   $21.53   $22.17  
  Annual Parking Rent  $1,500   $1,545   $1,591   $1,639   $1,688   $1,739   $1,791   $1,845   $1,900   $1,957   $2,016  
  Tenant Lease-up & Turnover 
  
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Potential Gross Income 
            
  
Rental Revenue 
    
 $2,452   $2,525   $2,601   $2,679   $2,760   $2,842   $2,928   $3,015   $3,106  
Absorption & Turnover Vacancy 
   
 $(1,226)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
General Vacancy & Loss 
   
 $-     $(126)  $(130)  $(134)  $(138)  $(142)  $(146)  $(151)  $(155) 
Parking Revenue          $134   $138   $142   $146   $151   $155   $160   $164   $169  
Effective Gross Income 
    
 $1,360   $2,537   $2,613   $2,691   $2,772   $2,855   $2,941   $3,029   $3,120  
Operating Expenses & Real Estate Taxes 
  
 $(736)  $(758)  $(780)  $(804)  $(828)  $(853)  $(878)  $(905)  $(932) 
Net Operating Income (NOI)        $624   $1,779   $1,833   $1,888   $1,944   $2,003   $2,063   $2,125   $2,188  
Tenant Improvements 
    
 $(1,891)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Leasing Commissions 
    
 $(147)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Capital Reserve          $(45)  $(46)  $(47)  $(49)  $(50)  $(52)  $(53)  $(55)   
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Operations 
 
 $(1,458)  $1,733   $1,785   $1,839   $1,894   $1,951   $2,009   $2,070    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Reversion    $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $23,035    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) TOTAL (Stabilized Phase) 
  
 $1,733   $1,785   $1,839   $1,894   $1,951   $2,009   $25,104    
Operational Phase Cash Flows 
   
 $(22,054)  $1,733   $1,785   $1,839   $1,894   $1,951   $2,009   $25,104    
Development Phase Cash Flows  $(3,881)  $(5,300)  $(4,389)  $20,595  
       
  
Development Phase IRR 22.9% 
           
  
Project Blended IRR 12.4%  $(3,881)  $(5,300)  $(4,389)  $(1,458)  $1,733   $1,785   $1,839   $1,894   $1,951   $2,009   $25,104    
Investment Analysis OCC:         
       
  
Dev't. Ph. "Canonical" OCC  32.2%         
       
  
Time T PV Stabilized Asset 9.0%        $20,595  
       
  
Time T PV Construction 3.0%        $(10,144) 
       
  
Time 0 PV Spec. Asset 10.5%  $15,264        
       
  
Time 0 PV Construction 3.0%  $(9,283)       
       
  
Time 0 Land Acquisition Cost  $(3,881)       
       
  
Time 0 NPV of Office Dev't Project  
(Including Land Opportunity Cost)  $     2,100   =  Investment Value Created by LR        
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MF Rental 
in Development Phase Stabilized Phase 
($1,000s) Acquisition Construction Lease-up         Operations       
Analysis Year     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
    
 
Time 0     Time T             Reversion   
Development                           
Land Acquisition Costs 
 
 $(2,424) 
          
  
Hard Costs 
  
 $(3,772)  $(3,772) 
        
  
Soft Costs 
  
 $(641) 
         
  
Contingency 
  
 $(441.38)  $(377) 
        
  
Developer Fee 
  
 $(400)  $(400) 
        
  
Total Development Costs    $(2,424)  $(5,255)  $(4,550) 
        
  
  
             
  
Operations Cumulative Rent Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Cumulative Expense Inflation 100% 103% 106% 109% 113% 116% 119% 123% 127% 130% 134% 
  Annual Gross Rent  $40.00   $41.20   $42.44   $43.71   $45.02   $46.37   $47.76   $49.19   $50.67   $52.19   $53.76  
  Annual Operating Expenses  $12.00   $12.36   $12.73   $13.11   $13.51   $13.91   $14.33   $14.76   $15.20   $15.66   $16.13  
  Annual Parking Rent  $1,500   $1,545   $1,591   $1,639   $1,688   $1,739   $1,791   $1,845   $1,900   $1,957   $2,016  
  Tenant Lease-up & Turnover 
  
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Potential Gross Income 
 
Avg. Unit Avg Rent 
         
  
Rental Revenue 
 
848 SF  $2,828  
 
 $1,584   $1,631   $1,680   $1,731   $1,783   $1,836   $1,891   $1,948   $2,006  
Absorption & Turnover Vacancy 
   
 $(792)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
General Vacancy & Loss 
   
 $-     $(65)  $(67)  $(69)  $(71)  $(73)  $(76)  $(78)  $(80) 
Parking Revenue          $88   $90   $93   $96   $99   $101   $105   $108   $111  
Effective Gross Income 
    
 $879   $1,656   $1,706   $1,757   $1,810   $1,864   $1,920   $1,978   $2,037  
Operating Expenses & Real Estate Taxes 
  
 $(475)  $(489)  $(504)  $(519)  $(535)  $(551)  $(567)  $(584)  $(602) 
Net Operating Income (NOI)        $404   $1,167   $1,202   $1,238   $1,275   $1,313   $1,353   $1,393   $1,435  
Tenant Improvements 
    
 $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Leasing Commissions 
    
 $(79)  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-      
Capital Reserve          $(59)  $(61)  $(63)  $(65)  $(67)  $(69)  $(71)  $(73)   
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Operations 
 
 $266   $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,244   $1,282   $1,320    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) from Reversion    $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $19,135    
Property Before Tax Cash Flow (PBTCF) TOTAL (Stabilized Phase) 
  
 $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,244   $1,282   $20,455    
Operational Phase Cash Flows 
   
 $(18,387)  $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,244   $1,282   $20,455    
Development Phase Cash Flows  $(2,424)  $(5,255)  $(4,550)  $18,653  
       
  
Development Phase IRR 25.1% 
           
  
Project Blended IRR 11.3%  $(2,424)  $(5,255)  $(4,550)  $266   $1,106   $1,139   $1,173   $1,208   $1,244   $1,282   $20,455    
Investment Analysis OCC:         
       
  
Dev't. Ph. "Canonical" OCC  26.9%         
       
  
Time T PV Stabilized Asset 7.0%        $18,653  
       
  
Time T PV Construction 3.0%        $(10,261) 
       
  
Time 0 PV Spec. Asset 8.5%  $14,604        
       
  
Time 0 PV Construction 3.0%  $(9,391)       
       
  
Time 0 Land Acquisition Cost  $(2,424)       
       
  
Time 0 NPV of MF Dev't Project  
(Including Land Opportunity Cost)  $     2,789   =  Investment Value Created by LR        
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